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Abstract
This Note discusses the territorial disputes in the Arctic, which are becoming increasingly
contentious as a result of the Arctic melt, and the potential resolutions through the mechanisms of
international law. Part I discusses the scientific consensus regarding the changing Arctic climate
and the resulting conflicts that arise from increased interests in the region. Part II evaluates the
varying legal paradigms that may be utilized in order to navigate through the competing claims.
Part III argues that, given the uncertainties surrounding both the outcome of any potential Inter-
national Court of Justice (”ICJ”) decision and entering into an Arctic Treaty, universal adherence
to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (”UNCLOS”) is the most efficient
mechanism to balance the interests of the signatory Arctic States.
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INTRODUCTION
The Arctic ecosystem is rapidly moving towards a state that
has not existed for over one million years.' This new Arctic will
likely have less permanent ice than exists at present, resulting in
ice-free summers within a century.2 While scientists debate the
cause and permanence of this rapid polar melt,' they seem to
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1. See J.T. Overpeck et al., Arctic System on Trajectory to New, Seasonally Ice-Free State,
86 EOS 309, 309-13 (2002) (discussing how Arctic climate falls outside prevailing pa-
rameters of glacial dynamics of recent Earth history); see also Andrew C. Revkin, Past Hot
Times Hold Few Reasons to Relax About New Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2005, at F2
(explaining that forty-nine million years ago Arctic Ocean was not covered in ice, but
instead was warm and covered in duckweed).
2. See Overpeck et al., supra note 1, at 309 (discussing how feedback-enhanced
warming is primarily responsible for climate change, and that there seems to be few, if
any, processes or feedback in Arctic climate which might alter this course); see also An-
drew C. Revkin, In a Melting Trend, Less Arctic Ice to Go Around, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005,
at Al (explaining that higher temperatures leaves lower amounts of ice in the Arctic to
reflect solar light back into space). Revkin further argues that this continual increase in
heat storage in the Arctic Ocean increases the amount of ice-melt. See Revkin, In a
Melting Trend, supra note 2, at Al (positing that as heat is trapped beneath ice layers,
these layers melt at a faster rate).
3. See Andrew C. Revkin, No Escape: Thaw Gains Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2005, at Fl (explaining how some researchers believe that Arctic's turbulent climate
makes it difficult to analyze effects resulting solely from human factors and also explain-
ing that many researchers warn against assuming such climate change will continue
into future); see also Revkin, Past Hot Times, supra note 1, at F2 (describing how some
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generally agree that the Arctic will ultimately become warmer.4
A rush is currently underway to claim undeveloped and, in
some cases, unseen territory; natural resources; and marine-ac-
cess claims worth hundreds of billions of dollars due in large
part to the polar melt.5 The value of these claims only rises as
the temperature does-a fact which is already creating lower
costs, largely by way of more navigable waterways, to access the
natural resources within the region and increasing the navigabil-
ity of the Northwest Passage ("The Passage").6 The Arctic melt is
stimulating the need of an international mechanism through
which to bring such claims to resolution.7
This Note discusses the territorial disputes in the Arctic,
which are becoming increasingly contentious as a result of the
Arctic melt, and the potential resolutions through the mecha-
nisms of international law. Part I discusses the scientific consen-
scientists believe that warming trends are simply part of patterns seen throughout
Earth's history, but that even they admit that current warming may be accelerated due
to human factors). These researchers further argue that the same Arctic feedbacks that
are amplifying human-induced climate changes are also amplifying natural variability,
which means that there could possibly be periods in the next few decades when the
region cools and ice grows. See Revkin, Past Hot Times, supra note 1, at F2.
4. See Revkin, No Escape supra note 3, at F1 (discussing consensus among experts
that Arctic climate will gradually increase in average temperature); see also Revkin, Past
Hot Times, supra note 1, at F2 (discussing how Arctic climate, particularly with respect to
temperature, has recently trended upward in way not consistent with established pat-
terns and trends that have taken place throughout recent history).
5. See SUSAN Joy HASSOL ET AL., THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, IMPACTS OF A 'ARMING ARc-
TIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 11 (2004) (discussing how Arctic melt may
increase access to natural resources in this region and also possibly exacerbate Arctic
sovereignty issues and disputes); see also Clifford Krauss et al., As Polar Ice Turns to Water,
Dreams of Treasure Abound, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at Al (explaining how Arctic melt
may unlock lucrative shipping routes, including Northwest Passage, and has prompted
number of companies and States to prospect for and make new claims); Andrew C.
Revkin, Under All That Ice, Maybe Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Fl (describing possi-
bility of large petroleum reserves underneath seabed of Arctic Circle).
6. See HASSOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 11 (discussing how Arctic melt may increase
navigation in Arctic waters and may make previously unreachable natural resources ex-
ploitable, and also may exacerbate sovereignty disputes arising over territory in region);
see also Krauss, supra note 5, at Al (examining how Arctic melt may unlock lucrative
shipping routes, including Northwest Passage, and has prompted number of companies
and States to prospect for and make new claims).
7. See Krauss, supra note 5, at Al (discussing that, due to Arctic melt, amount of
marine access rights and natural resources country can claim is not clear); see also
Michael Byers & Suzanne Lalonde, Our Arctic Sovereignty is on Thin Ice: Climate change has
Other Countries Warming to the Prospect of Encroaching on the Northwest Passage, GLOBE &
MAIL, Aug. 1, 2005, at All (arguing how Arctic melt causes uncertainty for Canada's
claims at international law).
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sus regarding the changing Arctic climate and the resulting con-
flicts that arise from increased interests in the region. Part II
evaluates the varying legal paradigms that may be utilized in or-
der to navigate through the competing claims. Part III argues
that, given the uncertainties surrounding both the outcome of
any potential International Court ofJustice ("ICJ") decision and
entering into an Arctic Treaty, universal adherence to the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS")
is the most efficient mechanism to balance the interests of the
signatory Arctic States.8
I. THE CLIMATE AND HISTORY: WHAT DOES
THE ARCTIC MELT MEAN?
The Arctic climate is warming at an accelerated pace, lead-
ing to potential territorial disputes that will heighten tensions
between States in the region.9 Section A of Part I presents the
scientific research that predicts this climatic change; ° examines
the history of the region, which puts into context the potential
territorial disputes; supplies background information concern-
ing the States that may be involved; and analyzes the specific dis-
putes that will be the most contentious."
8. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), located at The Hague, in the Nether-
lands, was borne out of the U.N. Charter in 1945 to serve as the judicial arm of the
United Nations. See BARRY CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw 288-90 (4th ed. 2003)
(discussing structure and functioning of ICJ). The ICJ increasingly hears cases regard-
ing territorial disputes. See id. at 284 (listing types of cases heard by ICJ). The ICJ hears
cases through special agreements ("compromise') between States, when parties state that
"compulsory jurisdiction" applies or by a treaty provision stipulating that all disputes
will be settled by the Court. See id. at 284 (explaining method by which disputes come
before ICJ); see also Brian Taylor Sumner, Note, Territorial Disputes at the International
Court of Justice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779, 1781 (2004) (discussing how ICJ decisions are bind-
ing in large part because parties have agreed to have disputes settled by ICJ judges).
9. See Overpeck et al., supra note 1, at 309 (explaining how feedback-enhanced
warming is primarily responsible for warming in Arctic region); see also Revkin, In a
Melting Trend, supra note 2, at Al (analyzing process of global warming and how it is
affecting Arctic sea ice).
10. See Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3, at Fl (positing that current warming could
melt glacial ice which has existed for millions of years, leading to severe consequences,
such as rising sea levels and temperatures worldwide); see also HASSOL ET AL., supra note
5 at 22 (discussing Arctic warming, in all its potential forms, based on observations over
past fifty years, and its consequences on Arctic region and worldwide).
11. See Daniel Howden, Race for the Arctic: An International "Cold War" Has Begun
Over Who Owns the Rapidly Unfreezing Wastes of the Far North and What Is Thought to Be its
Treasure of Natural Resources, INDEP. (UK),Jan. 5, 2005, at 26 (discussing history, climate
change, and virtually all aspects of Canadian Arctic waters); see also Stephen Thorne,
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A. Scientific Projections Regarding the Arctic Melt
To fully understand the importance of the territorial dis-
putes in the Arctic, the current development of this new and
valuable environment must first be understood. Records of in-
creasing temperatures and the decreases in the range and thick-
ness of Arctic Sea ice suggest that the Artic region is becoming
warmer 12 and that such warming is becoming a trend. 13 Many
experts assert that this particularly sharp trend in warming re-
sults from human-induced global warming, combined with the
region's tendency to amplify change.' 4
Some scientists and government officials, however, do not
agree that Arctic warming merits concern, arguing that it is not
known to what degree warming can be attributed to natural cy-
cles or human-induced warming.15 Though conceding that
global warming plays some factor in the Arctic warming, some
Canada Plans Arctic Eye, CANADIAN PREss, Aug. 28, 2005 (describing brief history of Hans
Island and potential for dispute over island).
12. See HASSOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 22 (arguing that observations over past fifty
years show decline in arctic sea-ice during all seasons, with most prominent retreat in
summer); see also Revkin, Past Hot Times, supra note 1, at F2 (explaining that Arctic
Ocean is warming at accelerated pace, which will result in Artic climate that stands in
contrast to recent Earth history); Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Scientists See New Signs of
Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at A20 (detailing NASA reports that recent
higher temperatures and retreat of sea ice in Arctic indicate that buildup of heat-trap-
ping gases are influencing Arctic climates); Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3, at F1 (argu-
ing that current warming of Arctic could melt Greenland's ice cap, which would raise
sea levels worldwide more than twenty feet).
13. See HASSOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 22 (describing effects of changes in climate
and natural systems on Arctic environment); see also Overpeck et al., supra note 1, at 313
(explaining that there are no known factors that can be altered to prevent warming of
Arctic).
14. See Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3, at F1 (explaining dynamics by which Arctic
region amplifies global environmental changes); see also HASSOL ET AL., supra note 5, at
20 (describing global warming in Arctic region is more pronounced due to several
unique environmental and geographical factors not present elsewhere); Overpeck et
al., supra note 1, at 313 (arguing that human-induced global warming is prevailing over
Arctic's natural environmental cycles).
15. See Krauss et al., supra note 5,(describing conversation with Igor L. Shpektor,
President of Russia's Union of Arctic Cities and Towns, in which Shpektor claims that
apple trees will not be growing in Vorkuta, Russian coal mining town); see also Revkin,
In a Melting Trend, supra note 2, at Al (explaining that some scientists argue that size of
ice cap could greatly vary, due to changes in wind patterns, which can cause ice to pile
up against one Arctic shore or drift away from another); Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3,
at F1 (describing conversation with Igor Polyakov, expert at International Arctic Re-
search Center of University of Alaska at Fairbanks, in which Polyakov argues that level
of variability in high-latitude regions is huge, making it difficult to separate from
human-induced trend).
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experts describe rising temperatures and shrinking sea ice as tak-
ing place within a complicated system that is still far from being
completely understood. 16
Although scientists disagree on the specific role that global
warming plays in the Arctic melt, there is a general consensus
that the Arctic will become warmer and that such warming ap-
pears to be human-induced. 17 Indeed, research suggests that the
planet is undergoing the early stages of human-induced global
warming evidenced by alterations in certain natural cycles, such
as the levels and fluctuations in ice in the Arctic Ocean.18 As a
result, scientists claim that each area of the Arctic Ocean that is
exposed due to melting ice will absorb a much larger amount of
solar energy, which would then lead to the melting of even
larger amounts of ice. 9
B. Northwest Passage: Background and Ramifications
Since the fifteenth century, navigators have sought a com-
mercial sea route north and west around the American conti-
nents, a search that has not been without its costs. 2z  Due to the
16. See Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3, at F1 (explaining how some Arctic research-
ers believe that because climate of Arctic nearly has most turbulent climate on Earth, it
is difficult to parse out any human-induced factors); see also Overpeck et al., supra note
1, at 313 (describing Arctic ecosystem as delicate interplay between several "hubs," such
as precipitation and human population, authors argue that this ecosystem is difficult to
completely understand and predict).
17. See Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3, at F1 (discussing consensus among experts
that Arctic climate will gradually increase in average temperature); see also HASSOL ET
AL., supra note 5, at 2 (describing how nature of carbon dioxide in atmosphere means
there would necessarily be lag time between when measures to curb global warming are
implemented and when their effects would be realized).
18. See Overpeck et al., supra note 1, at 312 (describing how research suggests that
although current warming trend still lies within boundaries of past glacial-interglacial
cycles, present rate of sea ice loss will push current trend out of these parameters within
century); see also Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3, at FI (analyzing amplifying nature of
Arctic as "flywheel," which, once started, tends to keep going, with scientists expecting
that insulating power of greenhouse gases to dominate Arctic's natural climate fluctua-
tions for centuries).
19. See Revkin, No Escape, supra note 3, at F1 (describing how Arctic region ampli-
fies climate change due to unique conditions such as how sunlight reacts to bright
white sea ice and dark sea beneath it); see also HASSOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 26 (ex-
plaining that as snow and ice melt, darker land and ocean surfaces absorb more heat,
which goes directly into warming rather than into evaporation, thus melting even more
ice).
20. See DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-01,
244 (1988) (describing this search for more efficient route from Europe to Asia and
different paths that could be taken through Northwest Passage); see also DONAT
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Arctic melt, scientists project that such a route, historically
known as the Northwest Passage, may be open to shipping within
this century. 21 Such a passage could cut the sea-route for cargo
from Europe to the Far East by 4000 miles, from the current
route through the Panama Canal, and a ship could eliminate
over 6650 nautical miles on a trip from England to Japan. 22 In-
sisting that the Northwest Passage is an "international strait"23
through which it has "transit passage, 2 4 the United States con-
tinually refuses to acknowledge Canadian sovereignty over the
Arctic Archipelago, and thus, the Northwest Passage.25
PHARAND, THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE, ARCTIC STRAITS, in 7 INTERNATIONAL STRAITS OF THE
WORLD 1-20 (1984) (explaining possible routes through Northwest Passage and some of
problems with each route).
21. See Howden, supra note 11, at 26 (describing how some experts believe that
within 100 years polar ice may have melted so significantly that area could be used as
major shipping route); see also Rebecca Dube, As Ice Melts, Debate Over Northwest Passage
Heats, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2006 (explaining how U.S. Navy predicted in 2001 that
within ten years, Northwest Passage would be open to non-strengthened vessels for one
month per year and how Chief of Ice Forecasting for Canadian Ice Service predicts that
by end of century there could be extended summertime shipping season).
22. See Roy A. Perrin III, Comment, Crashing Through the Ice: Legal Control of the
Northwest Passage or Who Shall be "Emperor of the North," 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 161 (1988)
(describing that trip from Yokohama, Japan, one of Japan's most important port cities,
to London, England would be reduced from 14,650 nautical-miles to less than 8,000
nautical-miles, and that travel from Yokohama to Rotterdam would also be reduced
from 15,640 nautical-miles to 6,610 nautical-miles); see also Dube, supra note 21 (detail-
ing how 12,600 nautical-mile trip from Europe to Asia via Panama Canal would be 7900
nautical-miles using Northwest Passage).
23. Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A Reassess-
ment, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 348 (1993) (explaining that some nationals seek inter-
national strait exception to coastal State sovereignty due to fear that they would become
subject to navigational regimes imposed by the coastal State); see also Dube, supra note
21 (detailing how United States claim that Northwest Passage is "international strait"
based on even relatively few transits that have been accomplished over time).
24. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 39, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Article 38 states:
Transit passage means the exercise ... of the freedom of navigation and over-
flight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. However, the require-
ment of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage
through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a
State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State.
See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 38; see also Dube, supra note 21 (explaining how
United States generally supports maximum freedom of seas and wish for free interna-
tional passage through Northwest Passage).
25. See Mike Perry, Rights of Passage: Canadian Sovereignty and International Law in
the Arctic, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 657, 669-70 (1997) (considering U.S. actions and
presence in Arctic Waters surrounding Canada and motivations and policies underlying
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C. Hans Island: Why Is This Little Rock So Important?
The 1973 Agreement between Denmark and Canada, relat-
ing to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Green-
land and Canada ("Danish-Canadian Delimitation Agree-
ment") ,2 6 defined the border between the two territories.27 The
Agreement listed 127 points between the Davis Strait and the
end of the Robeson Channel, from which geodesic lines were
drawn to form the border; but failed to draw a line from point
122 to point 123, a distance of 875 meters, in which a small rock,
called Hans Island, is located. 21 Canada and Denmark have long
disputed which State controls the small 1.3 kilometer island.29
Hans Island is situated between Greenland and Canada's Elles-
mere Island, approximately 1,100 kilometers south of the North
Pole.3" The island carries importance for several reasons, includ-
ing (1) the possible oil reserves lying beneath it and (2) its loca-
these actions); see also Dube, supra note 21 (summarizing how U.S. Ambassador to Ca-
nada, David Wilkins, stated that United States disagreed with Canadian claim concern-
ing Northwest Passage as recently as Jan. 25, 2006).
26. See Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the
Government of Canada Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
Greenland and Canada [hereinafter Danish-Canadian Delimitation Agreement], 17 De-
cember 1973, Den.-Can., available at http://www.un.org/Depts/UNCLOS/LEGIS
LATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/DNK-CAN1973CS.PDF (delineating
boundary between Greenland and Canada); see also Alex G. Oude Elferink, Arctic Mari-
time Delimitations: The Preponderance of Similarities with Other Regions, in THE LAW OF THE
SEA AND POLAR MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION 179, 194-95 (2001) (describ-
ing conditions and circumstances leading up to formation of Agreement).
27. See Elferink, supra note 26, at 181 (stating that boundary line was used to divide
fishing zones between two States); see also Danish-Canadian Delimitation Agreement,
supra note 26, art. I (listing seven articles that comprise Agreement, including Article 1,
which describes Agreement as determining dividing line between Greenland and Cana-
dian Arctic Islands for purpose of each State's exploration and exploitation of natural
resources of that part of continental shelf).
28. See Elferink, supra note 26, at 182 (stating there is no delimitation between
points 122 and 123 due to dispute over Hans Island); see also Danish-Canadian Delimita-
tion Agreement, supra note 26, art. 2 (listing geographic co-ordinates of each of 127
points, including omission of boundary line between points 122 and 123).
29. See Thorne, supra note 11 (explaining recent actions by both Canadian and
Danish Governments aimed at exerting sovereignty or control over small island and its
surrounding areas); see also Alexander Rubin, Hands Off Hans Island, CANADA FREE
PRESS, July 27, 2005 (depicting Hans Island as small pile of rocks far from any civiliza-
tion). The only inhabitants of the small rock are a local seal colony. See Howden, supra
note 11, at 26 (describing Hans Island, its natural features, wildlife, and its history).
30. See CBC News In-depth, It's a Fine Line: Disputing Boundaries, Oct. 11, 2005,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/boundary-disputes/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2007)
(detailing how every so often Canadian or Danish Governments send nationals to 1.3
square-kilometer Hans Island to leave something there such as Canadian or Danish
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tion at the center of the Kennedy Channel, a potentially impor-
tant shipping lane.31 A resolution of the dispute between Ca-
nada and Denmark over Hans Island may have significant
implications for determining the continental shelf boundaries
under UNCLOS; and will certainly affect resolution of the
Northwest Passage dispute because if Canada were to
subordinate its claims to either, it might lose any leverage it
holds in the Arctic region. 2
D. Russian Claims: How Other Claims May Have an Impact
Along with the disputes over the Northwest Passage and
Hans Island, other disputes could arise in the Arctic Region.
One such example of the uncertainty in the region is evidenced
by the actions of the former Dictator of the U.S.S.R.,Joseph Sta-
lin, who once simply drew a line from Murmansk to the North
Pole, and then from the North Pole to Chukchi and claimed it as
the "U.S.S.R. Polar Region."33 Now the mapping of the region
has greater ramifications and, instead of Stalin's claim, the lines
will be drawn by the Commission on the Limits of the Continen-
tal Shelf ("Commission"), which operates under the auspices of
UNCLOS. 4 The Commission consults seismic mapping of the
flag); see also Rubin, supra note 29 (discussing Hans Island's location in Nares Strait,
which lies between Greenland and Ellesmere Island).
31. See Krauss et al., supra note 5, at Al (detailing how major companies and vari-
ous States believe that shipping routes that would be available and natural resources
that might be uncovered could potentially be worth hundreds of millions or billions of
dollars); see also Rubin, supra note 29 (describing how melting of polar ice caps would
potentially open viable shipping and transport routes in Arctic and how Danish control
of Hans Island would give them free passage through important Arctic straits, as well as
any oil reserves discovered in area).
32. See Hans Island the Tip of Iceberg in Arctic Claims, CTV.cA NEws STAFF, July 31,
2005, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20050731/hansisland_
QP_050731?s_name=&no_ads= (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (describing how Canadian
Defense Minister Bill Graham's statements about Canadian sovereignty over Hans Is-
land was necessary because to set strong precedent for all remaining issues over sover-
eignty in region, particularly that of sovereignty over Northwest Passage).
33. See Krauss et al., supra note 5 (describing how claims were once made to Arctic
territory, and how these claims contrast to current division of this region that will likely
be made by international commission based on geography of seabed); see also Clifford
Krauss et al., Arctic riches coming out of the cold, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 10, 2005 (detail-
ing outlandish claims made by Stalin, according to Artur N. Chilingarov, Arctic ex-
plorer and deputy speaker of Russia's Duma).
34. See Krauss et al., supra note 5, at Al (describing how claims will now likely be
determined by division of region that will be made by international commission, based
on geography of seabed under UNCLOS); see also Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Reaction to
2007] UNCLOS AMD THE ARCTIC 1595
seabed geography, which is provided by the claiming signatory
State, in order to make territorial determinations.3 5
On December 10, 2001, Russia submitted a claim to 1.2 mil-
lion square kilometers of territory, including the North Pole-
nearly half of the Arctic Ocean-to the Commission, in accor-
dance with UNCLOS provisions. 6 As Russia is the first State to
submit a claim," other Arctic States have several reasons to de-
termine whether this claim overlaps with their respective conti-
nental shelves, especially since this claim covers an area contain-
ing significant quantities of oil." After deliberating, the Com-
mission requested that Russia revise its submission with respect
to its extended continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean. 9
Russia is still in the process of documenting its claim.4 °
Russian Continental Shelf Claim, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 969, 969-70 (2002) (explaining func-
tionality of Commission under UNCLOS).
35. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 969 (describing how commission reviews infor-
mation submitted by coastal State and then makes recommendations to State regarding
delimitation of its continental shelf); see also UNCLOS, art. 76(8) & annex II (articulat-
ing how each coastal State shall be responsible for submitting information on limits of
continental shelves beyond two hundred nautical miles form baselines).
36. See William Underhill, The North Pole Heats Up, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Dec. 5, 2005, at
I (describing Moscow's claim in 2001 and its subsequent rejection); see also Murphy,
supra note 34, at 969 (detailing these claims by Russia, which was first State to submit
such information to Commission); Andrew C. Revkin, Jockeying for Pole Position, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2004, at F4 (providing circumstances of Russian claim).
37. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 969 (describing how Russia was first State to
submit its claims to commission, which would review claims and also distribute the de-
tails of claims to all U.N. Member States); see alsojeff Sallot, Canada Joins with Denmark to
Map Depths of the Arctic, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 24, 2006, at 1 (explaining how Russia
claimed Lomonosov Ridge line within its claims, asserting that it was extension of Sibe-
rian continental shelf).
38. See Semyon Golovko, Warmer Climate Promotes Coldness in Relations: The Thawing
Pole May Generate a Quarrel Among the Northern States, DEF. & SEC., Sept. 9, 2005, at 1,
available at 2005 WLNR 14188357 (describing the amount as nearly five billion tons); see
also Sallot, supra note 37, at I (cautioning that there is still copious scientific work to be
done before it can be determined what natural resources are present in region, but fact
that there is considerable sediment on seabed is indication that there is gas and oil
underneath seabed).
39. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 970 (describing how in June 2002, Commission
asked Russian Federation to make revised submission with respect to its extended conti-
nental shelf in Central Arctic Ocean); see also Golovko, supra note 38, at 1 (explaining
how Russia's claims were tabled until further materials were provided in form of revised
submission to Commission).
40. See Golovko, supra note 38, at I (describing how Russia's claims were tabled
until further materials were provided in form of revised submission to Commission); see
also Krauss et al., supra note 5 (commenting that Russia's claims in 2001 were initially
rejected by Commission's technical panel and that there is hope that recent research by
ship named Akademik Fyodorov will provide new mapping data in its favor to support its
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION
The legal status of the Northwest Passage remains uncer-
tain. Canada claims control over it through the implementation
of the straight baseline theory4' or through historical title, but it
is unclear whether the Northwest Passage qualifies as an interna-
tional strait under UNCLOS, thus impacting the United States'
failure to possess the right of innocent passage through the in-
creasingly viable passage.12 Canada and Denmark also claim dis-
puted Hans Island, using legal claims such as historic title and
geography, hoping to benefit from the protective laws under
UNCLOS and to exclusively garner the resources that could
comprise the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") of Hans Is-
land.43
Part II discusses these claims, as well as Russia's claims in the
region and how the United States' failure to ratify UNCLOS
threatens the United States' future claims to the abundant re-
sources in the Arctic." Finally, Part II will address the three
peaceful solutions that might conceivably be utilized in order to
amicably resolve the territorial disputes in the Arctic: (1) sub-
mitting them to the ICJ; (2) entering into a treaty similar to the
Antarctic Treaty; and (3) all interested parties ratifying UN-
pending re-submission to Commission); Murphy, supra note 34, at 970 (explaining how
Russian Federation's revised submission is still pending).
41. The straight baseline theory is a theory first established by the ICJ in the Fisher-
ies Case whereby States can claim that coastal waters are internal waters provided the
baselines do not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coastline, the waters lying within the baselines are closely linked to the coastal State's
domain and the enclosed waters represent economic interests which are particular to
the region and which have an importance evidenced by a long history of use. See Fisher-
ies Case (U.K v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116 (Dec. 18) (establishing elements of straight base-
line test); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTiC WATERS, supra note 20 (detailing ramifica-
tions of straight baseline theory in relation to territorial claims to coastal waters).
42. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 34-45 (providing standards for "international
strait" and providing for right of innocent passage). See generally PHARLAND, CANADA'S
ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20 (discussing in depth Northwest Passage and varying legal
theories that could conceivably settle territorial dispute.)
43. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 55-75 (laying out criteria for establishing Ex-
clusive Economic Zones ("EEZ") and the potential bars on islands possessing EEZ); see
also Thorne, supra note 11 (describing potential dispute between Canada and Den-
mark).
44. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 970 (describing Commission's process of han-
dling UNCLOS claims). See generally GEORGE V. GALDORISI & KEVIN R. VIENNA, BEYOND
THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. OCEANS POLICY (1997) (writing about
history of United States and UNCLOS).
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A. International Law Governing the Northwest Passage
The following sections analyze the international law that
governs any dispute over sovereignty of the Northwest Passage.
Section 1 discusses straight baselines, specifically how they may
be used to enclose sections of the Northwest Passage as Cana-
dian internal waters. Section 2 discusses international law gov-
erning international straits and its interplay with straight base-
lines.
1. Straight Baselines
On September 10, 1985, the Canadian Secretary of State for
External Affairs read a statement to the House of Commons in
which he asserted Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Pas-
sage and the Arctic Archipelago.46 He claimed that Canada con-
trolled the Passage as internal waters and stated that drawing
straight baselines around the islands of the Arctic Archipelago
effectively enclosed the waters as Canadian territory.47 The Sec-
retary supported these claims in international law by asserting
that Canada's territorial sea under UNCLOS extended twelve
miles from the Canadian coastal baselines.4"
The 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,49 decided by the
45. See generally GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 44 (discussing UNCLOS, in partic-
ular, UNCLOS and how it pertains to United States); Rothwell, supra note 23, 96-115
(examining ICJ, Antarctic Treaty, and UNCLOS throughout).
46. See Canada Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty, 24 I.L.M. 1723 (1985)
(declaring that Northwest Passage and Arctic Islands were Canadian territory); see also
Douglas M. Johnston, The Northwest Passage Revisited, 33 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L LAw 145,
148 (2002) (noting that Canada drew its straight baselines under Territorial Sea Graph-
ical Co-ordinates (Area 7) Order (Privy Council 1985-2739, Sept. 10, 1985)).
47. See Canada Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty, supra note 46 (declaring
that Northwest Passage and Arctic Islands would be enclosed by Canadian baselines); see
also Johnston, supra note 46, at 148 (noting that Canadian baselines were legal and
would enclose Northwest Passage).
48. See Canada Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty, supra note 46 (proclaim-
ing Canadian straight baselines as means to exert Canadian sovereignty); see also Act to
Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, S.C. 1969-70, c.68, s.1243; Suzanne
Lalonde, Increased Traffic through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada's State of Readiness, 38
R.J.T. 49, 63 (2004) (stating that in response to voyage of Manhattan, Prime Minister
Trudeau proclaimed extension of Canada's territorial waters from three to twelve
miles).
49. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18) (examining and
deciding dispute between United Kingdom and Norway over sovereignty of fishing wa-
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ICJ, set out the requirements for a State to make use of straight
baselines along its coast in order to enclose inlets, bays, harbors,
and even offshore islands.5 ° The Court analyzed the legality of
the Norwegian system of baselines. 5' The Norwegian baselines
were drawn around its coast, enclosing inlets, fjords, bays, and
the Norwegian skjaergaard-the mass of islands and rocks that
border most of the Norwegian coastline.5 2 The ICJ ruled in
favor of Norway and, as a result, created an expanding concep-
tion of what territory qualified as internal waters. 5' The straight
baseline test set forth by the Court requires choosing points at
land or low-water marks and connecting the marks by drawing
straight lines between them.54 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case, the effect of using these baselines was to extend Norway's
territorial sea to the outermost edges of the skjaergaard.55 The
Court thus rejected the United Kingdom's contention that this
ters surrounding Norwegian coastline in 1951). For more information, see Lalonde,
supra note 48, 69-70 (discussing Fisheries Case and circumstances which led to its submis-
sion and resolution in front of ICJ).
50. See Fisheries Case, 1951 LC.J. at 133 (articulating requirements for any State to
establish straight baselines around its coast); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, 69-70
(describing Fisheries Case and requirements for establishing baselines); Tullio Scovazzi,
The Baseline of the Territorial Sea: The Practice ofArctic States, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
POLAR MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION 69, 70 (2001) (analyzing Norway's es-
tablishment of baselines around its coast and subsequent ICJ case dealing with their
legitimacy).
51. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 143 (examining legality of Norwegian straight
baseline system); see also Scovazzi, supra note 50, at 70-71 (stating that Fisheries Case was
first case in which international court decided on legality of straight baseline system).
52. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 127 (detailing how straight baselines were
drawn); see also Scovazzi, supra note 50, at 71-72 (describing Norwegian coastline as
made up of deep indentations (fjords), numerous islands, islets, rocks and reefs, some
of which make up skjaergaard).
53. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 129, 143 (detailing how Court decided that wa-
ters with baselines drawn by Norway were internal waters under international law); see
also Scovazzi, supra note 50, at 71 (stating that ICJ decided that baselines created by 1935
Norwegian Decree were not contrary to international law).
54. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 129-33 (stating that possessing land is what gives
sovereign right to possess water and that clarifying land boundaries would appear to be
pre-requisite to establishing right to possess water); see also Scovazzi, supra note 50, at 72
(discussing Fisheries Case and criteria for establishing baselines).
55. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 127-32 (describing islands, fjords, and other fea-
tures of skjaergaard which were enclosed by baselines); see also DAN P. O'CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA 200 (1982) (detailing how from 1812 to 1948 Norway
and its neighbors, particularly Denmark, had issued series of Royal Decrees which estab-
lished limitations, later in form of baselines, which enclosed surrounding waters, partic-
ularly those utilized for fishing).
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method could only be employed across bays. 56 After the Court
upheld the legitimacy of these baselines, it went on to describe
the requirements necessary to establish legal straight baselines
around coastal regions, namely: (1) baselines must not depart
to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coastline; (2) the waters lying within the baselines must be
closely linked to the coastal State's domain as to be considered
internal waters; and (3) that the waters represent economic in-
terests which are particular to the region and which have an im-
portance evidenced by a long history of use.5 7
This straight baseline test initially did not allow the right of
passage to other States in the enclosed waters, no matter what
the legal rights were prior to a State enclosing its waters using
the baselines system.58 This was an inequitable result, one which
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone ("1958 Convention")59 sought to remedy by making the
straight baseline test subject to the right of innocent passage if
the waters were previously territorial waters or high seas. 60 Ca-
nada and several other States never became signatories to the
56. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 129-33 (stating "there is no valid reason to draw
[straight baselines] only across bays . . . and not also to draw them between islands,
islets and rocks, across the sea separating them, even when such areas do not fall within
the conception of a bay"); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, 69-70 (discussing U.K.'s asser-
tions in Fisheries Case).
57. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 133 (stating three factors that would be basis for
establishing straight baselines); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, at 69-70 (describing rea-
sons court gave for its decision, including three requirements for establishing base-
lines).
58. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 228 (stating that
under customary international law applied by ICJ in Fisheries Case, there was no right of
passage in waters enclosed by straight baselines); see also O'CONNELL, supra note 55, at
385-86 (asserting that access to sea at either end of landlocked waters does not allow
passage through internal waters).
59. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force on Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter 1958 Conven-
tion]; see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 226 (explaining that
1958 Convention corrected this mistake by allowing for innocent passage even where
waterways were subsequently enclosed by baselines).
60. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 228 (discussing im-
portance right of innocent passage to international trade and shipping); see also 1958
Convention, supra note 59, art. 5(2). Article 5(2) states:
Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with article 4 has
the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been con-
sidered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent
passage, as provided in articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters.
See 1958 Convention, supra note 59, art. 5(2).
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1958 Convention, however, leading some to believe that its lim-
ited ratification made it unlikely that the provision for innocent
passage in newly enclosed waters ever became legally binding on
all States.6 1
Following from the definition of an international strait
found in the 1958 Convention, UNCLOS 62 incorporated and
codified the existing customary international law governing
straight baselines, also including additional criteria for the draw-
ing of baselines around archipelagic States.63 The requirement
for drawing baselines of this sort were virtually the same as that
of coastlines of mainland States, except that it was to be applied
to States made wholly of an archipelago, such as Indonesia.64
In 1986 Canada drew straight baselines along its coast and
around its Arctic Archipelago, in accordance with the Fisheries
Case requirements. 65 To understand whether these baselines are
legal, one must first analyze whether the baselines depart to a
significant extent from the Canadian coastline, as is the first re-
quirement under the test established by the ICJ in the Fisheries
Case. Both the 1958 Convention and UNCLOS allow baselines
to be drawn where the coastline is deeply indented or if there is
61. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARcTIc WATERS, supra note 20, at 228-29 (stating that
only twenty-one of sixty States which have employed straight baselines have become
signatories to 1958 Convention); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, at 78 (noting that
Canada never signed 1958 Convention).
62. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 34-36 (defining "international strait" and ex-
plaining what rights are affected in such straits); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, at 64
(discussing how UNCLOS adapted 1958 Convention's definition of "international
strait" into its text).
63. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 7-8, and 47 (codifying existing international
law and listing requirements for drawing baselines around archipelagic States); see also
Lalonde, supra note 48, at 72 (describing how 1958 Convention and UNCLOS codified
three requirements of Fisteries Case and these Convention's effects on drawing of base-
lines around Canadian Archipelago).
64. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 46(a), 47 (detailing how straight baselines
could be drawn around coasts of States made up entirely of islands, also known as
archipelagic States"); see also BO JOHNSON THEUTENBERG, THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW
OF THE SEA (1984) (discussing evolution of international law of the sea, while analyzing
in-depth UNCLOS in 1982).
65. See Territorial Sea Geographic Coordinates (Area 7) Order of 10 September
1985, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL 2-82 (1987)
(detailing Canada's establishment of straight baselines around archipelago in its Arctic
waters); see also Scovazzi, supra note 50, at 76 (stating that in 1985 Canada established
straight baseline system of 139 segments, enclosing Canadian Arctic Archipelago, in
response to voyage of Polar Sea).
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a fringe of islands along the coast.6 6 Additionally, when viewed
as a whole, baselines should not depart from the general direc-
tion of the coastline.67 One potential problem is that the Cana-
dian Archipelago does not appear to conform to the Canadian
coastline when viewed as a whole.6 8 Several arguments have
been made, however, that could neutralize this criticism: (1)
that the Canadian coastline is so varied with indentations and
peninsulas that no general direction of the coastline could be
ascertained;69 and (2) that the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is
actually part of the Canadian coast and therefore baselines
drawn between its islands by definition are drawn along the
coastline.7v
The second factor to be addressed, established by the ICJ in
the Fisheries Case, is whether the waters lying within the baselines
are so closely linked to the coastal State's domain as to be con-
sidered internal waters.71 With respect to this requirement, the
66. See 1958 Convention, supra note 59, art. 4(1) (detailing how baselines may be
drawn around coastline of coastal States); see also UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 7(1)
(reinforcing earlier 1958 Convention by detailing where baselines may be drawn
around coasts of coastal States).
67. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 L.C.J. 116, 133 (Dec. 18) (describing
limitations on coastal baselines); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, at 69 (stating that while
State must be allowed to adapt its delimitation to its needs, drawing of baselines must
not depart to any appreciable extent from general direction of coast).
68. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 71 (stating that although coastline is indented,
archipelago extends almost 1,000 miles north from mainland and northern group of
islands is separated by a wide body of water); see also Johnston, supra note 46, at 148
(discussing how some experts question analogy between Fisheries Case and Canadian
Archipelago, due to deeply indented coastline of northern Norway, making baselines
easier to draw to determine Norway's internal waters).
69. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 72 (stating that no general direction could be
ascertained with any accuracy due to peninsulas and indentations); see also Mark Killas,
The Legality of Canada's Claims to the Waters of its Arctic Archipelago, 19 OrTAWA L. REV. 95,
111 (1987) (discussing geographic features of Canadian Arctic Archipelago).
70. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 72-73 (proposing that because term "coast" is
inherently ambiguous, it could be argued that seaward coasts of Arctic Archipelagic
islands was effectively Canadian coastline); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS,
supra note 20, at 162-63 (discussing straight baselines around Canadian Arctic Archipel-
ago and how baselines might be upheld based on fact that baselines follow northerly
direction of Canadian coastline and also that there is close link between land and sea in
Canadian Arctic Archipelago); Donat Pharand, Sovereignty and the Canadian North, in
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROS-
PECTS FOR CANADA 141, 152 (1985) (analyzing sovereignty issues which Canada faces in
its Arctic territory).
71. See Fisheries Case 1951 I.CJ. at 133 (explaining second factor that must be met
in order to establish strait baselines). See generally Lalonde, supra note 48, at 72 (discuss-
ing analyzing Fisheries Case).
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waters surrounding the Canadian coast are unique because they
are frozen for most of each year.7 2 Some experts have also ar-
gued for a ratio of sea to land test, whereby the ratio of the land
present within an archipelago is compared with the total land
area in that same region.73 Under this test, Canada has a higher
ratio of land to sea in its archipelago than is present in the Nor-
wegian skjaergaard.4
The third and final factor in this test is whether there are
sufficient economic interests, particular to the region, which are
evidenced by a long history of use.75 Over 20,000 Canadian Inuit
currently live in northern Canada, including the Arctic Archipel-
ago. 76 They have been living in this region since pre-historic
times and are almost wholly dependent upon hunting and fish-
ing in these areas for their food, clothing, and overall survival.7 7
72. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 72-73 (stating that because waters around archi-
pelago are frozen for most of year, they are more like land than water); see also John
Byrne, Canada and the Legal Status of Ocean Space in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, 28 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1970) (describing climate in region of Arctic Archipel-
ago); Ivan L. Head, Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 Mc-
GILL L.J. 200, 223 (1963) (detailing unique climate in Arctic region, which might affect
Canadian claims).
73. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 73 (arguing that this test would prevent States
from claiming sovereignty over vast expanses of ocean); see also Killas, supra note 69, at
119 (arguing that sea-to-land ratio test is most appropriate for interpreting Article 7(3)
of UNCLOS).
74. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 73 (describing how this ratio test would affect
Canadian claims in its Arctic Archipelago); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS,
supra note 20, at 163 (stating that sea-to-land ratio of Canada is 0.822 to 1, while that of
Norwegian coast is only 3.5 to 1).
75. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 133 (describing Court's third factor, which is
whether there are economic interests as result of long history of use); see also UNCLOS,
supra note 24, art. 5 (further codifying test first described in Fisheries Case and later
codified in 1958 Convention); 1958 Convention, supra note 59, arts. 3-13 (codifying
decision and in particular third factor from Fisheries Case).
76. See PHARAND, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS OF THE WORLD, supra note 20, at 50 (dis-
cussing number and character of Inuit communities in Canadian territory); see also Re-
port: Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project, 3 CAN. Gov. CAT. No. R2-46 (1976) (detailing
populations of native population in Canada).
77. See Donald R. Rothwell & Christopher C.Joyner, The Polar Oceans and the Law of
the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR MARITIME DELIMITATION ANDJURISDICrION 19
(2001) (describing how Inuit people in Alaska, Northern Canada, and Greenland devel-
oped culture dependent on exploitation of animals found on and under sea ice); see
also Scovazzi, supra note 50, at 78 (stating that from "time immemorial" Inuit have used
and occupied ice as they have done so with land); David VanderZwaag & Donat
Pharand, Inuit and the Ice: Implications for the Canadian Arctic Water, 21 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
53, 64-70 (1988) (discussing history of Inuit population in northern Canada and its
surrounding waters).
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The Inuit's use is very similar to that of the Norwegian fishermen
in the Fisheries Case, and could satisfy the third requirement for
the baselines test.78
2. International Straits
Even if the Canadian baselines were found to be legal, this
would not settle the issue of Canadian sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage. This is because if, as described below, the
Northwest Passage was an international strait prior to the estab-
lishment of the baselines, a right to innocent passage for the in-
ternational community would still exist. 79 If there were no such
right to innocent passage, however, the establishment of the
baselines would effectively create a bar on innocent passage and
Canada would thus be able to regulate all travel within the
Northwest Passage. °
For this reason, the legal analysis that may be most impor-
tant to the outcome of the Canadian claims is whether they con-
stitute international straits under existing international law.81
The significance of this determination is that an international
strait is considered international waters, whereby foreign vessels
78. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 127-28 (discussing how Norwegian fishermen
had for centuries survived to great extent off of fish they caught in Norwegian coastal
waters). But see Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customay International Law, 27 MICH.J. INT'L
L. 115, 160 (2005) (pointing out that longstanding local custom such as Norway's then-
local "straight baseline" method can trump established customary international law,
particularly when other States fail to object to local practice, potentially complicating
any assumption that "straight baseline" is fail-safe rule of customary international law).
79. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 74 (discussing how innocent passage survives
establishment of straight baselines); see also N.C. Howson, Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-
American Dispute over the Arctic's Northwest Passage, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 360
(1988) (stating crucial issue is status of Northwest Passage under international law prior
to their enclosure, particularly whether there is right of innocent passage before estab-
lishment of baselines).
80. See Lalonde, supra note 48, at 74 (stating that if, prior to 1985, no right of
innocent passage existed, none would after establishment of baselines); see also Howson,
supra note 79, at 356-62 (highlighting potential inconsistencies that could trip up Ca-
nada's bid for "exclusive sovereignty," whereby if Canada has claimed Northwest Pas-
sage belongs to them based on theories other than internal waters, that theory may not
hold up).
81. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 351-57 (reasoning that because of developments
in international law, such as expansion of territorial sea regime, navigation regime of
international straits would likely be applied to any determination of sovereignty over
Northwest Passage); see also Johnston, supra note 46, at 148-49 (providing analysis of
whether Northwest Passage is international strait and detailing possible factors in any
such analysis).
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have a right of innocent passage, with no need of permission or
supervision by any neighboring coastal State. 2 In contrast, in-
ternal waters are subject to complete sovereignty by the coastal
State, and other States must abide by their regulations within the
territorial waters.83 UNCLOS addressed the issue surrounding
international straits by defining the scope of straits where the
right of the international community to openly navigate straits
would apply.8 4 UNCLOS expanded the countries' territorial
seas, but in the process, created a safe passage for foreign vessels
to use international straits.
85
b. International Law Governing International Straits
The Corfu Channel Case, decided by the ICJ in 1949, forms
the basis for the definition of an "international strait" in the con-
text of customary international law.8 6 The ICJ upheld the right
of innocent passage for the U.K. Navy, based upon the meeting
of geographic components of the Strait of Corfu and the inter-
national navigational functionality of the strait.8 7 In so doing,
the ICJ created two necessary criteria governing the existence of
82. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 30-49 (Apr. 9) (defining
innocent passage and associated rights); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 351-57
(describing rights associated with international straits, such as that of innocent passage,
which would prove most beneficial to States wishing to transit Northwest Passage).
83. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 8 (defining internal waters as waters which are
landward of baselines, which form boundaries for States' territorial seas); see also Roth-
well, supra note 23, at 351-57 (contrasting legal characteristics of international strait
with that of internal waterway).
84. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 34-45 (declaring that "international straits"
were water routes where shipping vessels or other vessels had right of innocent pas-
sage); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARc'ric WATERS, supra note 20, at 215-16 (discussing
legal status of Northwest Passage and particularly addressing definition of "interna-
tional straits" provided by UNCLOS).
85. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 34-45 (declaring that "international straits"
were water routes where shipping vessels or other vessels had right of innocent pas-
sage); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 215-16 (discussing
legal status of Northwest Passage and particularly addressing definition of "interna-
tional straits" provided by UNCLOS).
86. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 30-49 (defining what qualified as "interna-
tional strait," as well as qualities straits possessed); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC
WATERS, supra note 20, at 216-19 (analyzing international law governing definition of
international straits, including UNCLOS, 1958 Convention, and 1949 Corfu Channel
Case).
87. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 30-49 (describing reasons for Court's de-
termination that United Kingdom had right of innocent passage through Corfu Chan-
nel); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 216-19 (discussing
ICJ's decision in Corfu Channel Case).
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international straits: (1) geography, meaning that the strait con-
nected either two areas of high seas or two EEZs; and (2) func-
tionality, the usage or traffic traveling across the strait's waters."
The Northwest Passage is a series of straits connecting the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans made up of a series of routes be-
tween islands." This connection between the two oceans raises
the question of whether the Northwest Passage can be consid-
ered a single strait for the purpose of analysis under interna-
tional law.9 ° If the Passage is not considered a single strait due
to the vast number of islands within the Arctic Archipelago, ex-
perts believe it will ease Canada's ability to assert that the Passage
is considered to be internal waters."
Many commentators find little doubt that the Northwest
Passage satisfies the geographic element for an international
strait due to the several routes of the passage which connect
oceans and EEZs.92 With the first element of an international
strait largely assumed, the real question relates to interpreting
the Corfu Channel Case and its method of determining naviga-
88. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 4 (holding that these are two criteria that
must be examined when determining whether strait is considered "international
strait"); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 216-21 (discussing
how ICJ established criteria for straits to be international straits).
89. See Center for Oceans Law and Policy, International Energy Policy, in THE ARCTIC
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 287-88 (Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and Alex-
ander S. Skaridov eds., 2005) (describing Northwest Passage as series of straits); see also
Rothwell, supra note 23, at 352-53 (describing and detailing particular geography of
Northwest Passage, noting that this Passage is, in reality, series of connected strait
passages).
90. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 351-57 (stating that although geography of
Northwest Passage presents some novel conditions, because it connects areas of high
seas or EEZs it should simply be looked at as whole strait for any legal analysis); see also
Johnston, supra note 46, at 148-49 (questioning whether Northwest Passage would be
viewed as single strait or as series of straits for purposes of legal analysis).
91. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 351-57 (stating that should Northwest Passage be
found to not be one single passage, analysis of whether it is geographically considered
international strait might favor Canadian interests); see also Johnston, supra note 46, at
148-49 (examining whether Northwest Passage is considered international strait and
what determinations would be crucial to such determination).
92. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 353-54 (predicting that despite little to no prece-
dent of whether such series of straits could be determined to be only one strait for
purposes of analyzing whether this passage is considered international strait, more im-
portant characteristics are whether this route connects areas of high seas or EEZs); see
also P-ARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 224. Some arguments have
been made that, because of thick layer of ice that covers the Passage for majority of
each year, no actual link between the two oceans exists.
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tional functionality.9 3 In the Corfu Channel Case, the United
Kingdom sent its Navy through the Corfu Channel, running
from the Ionian Sea to the Adriatic Sea between Corfu and Alba-
nia, without permission from the Albanian government. 94 The
United Kingdom argued that the geographic element was the
deciding factor in determining whether a strait qualifies as inter-
national and that functionality should have little bearing on the
Court's determination.95 On the other hand, Albania argued
that the functionality of the Channel should be the deciding fac-
tor, stating that the Corfu Channel did not have vast importance
for international navigation purposes and did not receive
enough volume of ship traffic to warrant being considered an
international strait.9 6 The ICJ determined that the Corfu Chan-
nel was an international strait, stating that the most important
factors in determining an international strait are its geography
in connecting separate oceans and whether it is used interna-
tionally for navigation purposes. 97  Moreover, the ICJ deter-
mined that the presence of other available routes does not affect
the legal status of a strait's categorization, so long as the strait
has been used by international maritime vessels. 98
93. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 at 30-49 (Apr. 9) (describ-
ing ICJ's determination that Corfu Channel was international strait, in particular that
this channel connected separate oceans and was used for international navigation); see
also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 224-25 (discussing Corfu Chan-
nel Case, in particular that Court established both geographic and functional require-
ments for any strait to be denoted "international strait").
94. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 4-30 (describing circumstances that led to
this matter coming before I.C.J.); see also GEORGE ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 98 (1971) (detailing events which led up to Albania and England's dispute over
whether Corfu Channel qualified as international strait).
95. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 4-49 (detailing U.K.'s arguments in front
of ICJ). For more information on the Corfu Channel Case, see ELIAN, supra note 94, at 98
(discussing important decisions and advisory opinions by ICJ, including the Corfu Chan-
nel Case).
96. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 4-49 (detailing Albania's arguments in
front of ICJ). For more information on the Corfu Channel Case, see PHARAND, CANADA'S
ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 218-21 (discussing Corfu Channel Case with regard to
establishment of criteria for declaring waterways as international straits).
97. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 28 (stating that two most crucial factors are
straits geographical characteristics as connecting two parts of high seas and also
whether it is being used for international navigation); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARC-
TIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 217-26 (discussing Corfu Channel Case, particularly geo-
graphic requirements established by ICJ, that strait connect high seas and contain inter-
national maritime traffic).
98. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 28 (explaining how existence of other
routes does not affect its status as international strait so long as it has been useful route
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Some experts assert that, because the ICJ in the Corfu Chan-
nel Case focused mainly on the geographic characteristics of a
strait, this should be the primary inquiry when making any simi-
lar examination.99 This would relegate the functionality of such
a strait to merely a subsidiary inquiry. 00 Nevertheless, function-
ality does remain an element in classifying the legal status of a
strait.' 0 '
Though the Corfu Channel Case defined the basic criteria of
what constitutes an "international strait," the ICJ did not fully
settle all questions regarding travel through international
straits.' °2 The 1958 Convention codified a great deal of existing
customary international law, including the ICJ's ruling in the
Corfu Channel Case in Article 14.03 The Convention defines the
right of innocent passage through an international strait in for-
eign territorial waters as allowing ships to legally pass through
for international maritime traffic). For more information on the Corfu Channel Case, see
ELIAN, supra note 94, at 98-100 (discussing Corfu Channel Case, particularly its impor-
tance as foundational case for ICJ).
99. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 353-54 (describing how ICJ in Corfu Channel Case
emphasized geographic qualities of that strait, making level of maritime navigation only
subsidiary); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARrc WATERS, supra note 20, at 216-21 (assert-
ing that due to ICJ's decision in Corfu Channel Case, geographic considerations are far
more important than any other considerations in determining whether one strait is
"international strait").
100. See ELIAN, supra note 94, at 98-100 (detailing decision in Corfu Channel Case,
particularly how ICJ based its decision that Albanian People's Republic could not regu-
late innocent passage of warships through that strait in large part on geographic posi-
tion of Corfu Channel); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 353-54 (describing how ICJ
emphasized geographic qualities of this strait, making level of maritime navigation sub-
sidiary).
101. See Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.CJ. at 28 (holding that while any strait's geo-
graphical situation is of utmost importance, it is also necessary that any strait be useful
route for international maritime traffic); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCrIC WATERS,
supra note 20, at 217-23 (explaining that UNCLOS provided different categories of in-
ternational straits, but ambiguity surrounding functionality of Northwest Passage will be
determinative as to whether it is declared international strait).
102. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 216-21 (describing
that Corfu Channel did not fully address amount of maritime traffic necessary to meet
functionality requirement for strait to be determined to be "international strait"); see
also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 353-54 (explaining how ICJ in Corfu Channel Case did not
fully address all considerations with regard to international straits, such as amount of
maritime traffic necessary to meet functionality requirement).
103. See 1958 Convention, supra note 59, art. 12 (detailing factors necessary for
strait to be international strait under international law); Bernard H. Oxman, The Territo-
rial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 830, 832-34 (2006) (discussing
1958 Convention and while some items were codified, ambiguities or Convention's si-
lence left items such as limits on high seas undefined).
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seas without encroaching on the internal waters of others.10 4
Pursuant to the Convention, the State that controls the territo-
rial sea in which the strait is located, suspend passage through
the strait by foreign ships under any circumstances.1 0 5
Despite the customary international law codified in the
1958 Convention, there still remained unsettled issues-the Six-
Day War in the Middle East in 1967 for example, began in large
part due to Egypt's closing of the Strait of Tiran in the Gulf of
Aqaba."°6 The League of Nations' mandate following World
War I designated this strait as an international strait, with rights
of innocent passage.'0 7 This conflict served as a major signal
that further codification and clarification was necessary.
Further codification came in the form of UNCLOS,01 s
which extended the amount of water countries could claim as
territorial sea to twelve nautical miles.0 9 This revision resulted
104. See 1958 Convention, supra note 59, art. 14 (defining right of innocent pas-
sage as allowing transit for ships through foreign waters without trespassing into State's
sovereign territory); see also Oxman, supra note 102, at 832-34 (assessing International
Law Commission's efforts to codify customary international law, with convention's such
as 1958 Geneva Convention).
105. See 1958 Convention, supra note 59, art. 16 (stating that although States may
prevent non-innocent passage and although States may prevent passage if essential for
its own security, State may not suspend innocent passage of foreign ships between one
part of high seas and another); see also Oxman, supra note 102, at 832-37 (addressing
evolution of territorial sovereignty over oceans through evolution of UNCLOS).
106. See Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, Mar. 1, 1957
(declaring that Israel would consider closure of Strait of Tiran as casus belli, or act of
war, as Israel withdrew from Sinai and Gaza in 1957); see also Egypt Closes Gulf Of Aqaba
To Israel Ships: Defiant move by Nasser raises Middle East tension, LONDON TIMES, May 23,
1967, at Al (describing that on May 22, 1967, President Nasser of Egypt announced
closure of Strait of Tiran, vital shipping route for Israel).
107. See Egypt Closes Gulf Of Aqaba To Israel Ships, supra note 106 (detailing Nasser's
announcement of closure of Strait of Tiran, vital Israeli shipping route, on May 22,
1967). For more information, see Aide-memoire from Egypt to the United States regarding
Passage through the Straits of Tiran, Jan. 28, 1950, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: For-
eign Relations, Historical Documents: 1947-74, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/.
108. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 34-45 (codifying existing customary interna-
tional law and previous conventions with regards to international straits); see also
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 216-17 (detailing how UNCLOS
was another codification of international law, particularly with regard to international
straits, following 1958 Convention and previous customary international law).
109. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 3 (stating that coastal States had right to
demarcate territorial sea off its shores for up to twelve nautical miles from its coast or
coastal baselines); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 350-51 (stating that Article 3 of
UNCLOS extended right of coastal States to demarcate territorial sea off its shores for
up to twelve nautical miles from its coast or coastal baselines).
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in the enclosure of some international straits, making it neces-
sary to provide the international community with "transit pas-
sage" through newly-created territorial seas." 0 UNCLOS allows
international vessels to freely navigate international straits now
enclosed within territorial seas if the strait links oceans or
EEZs.' 11 Despite the new creation of "transit passage" and the
detailed designation of what rights of passage ships had through
straits in territorial seas, UNCLOS failed to completely define
what constituted an international strait, and which specific straits
used for international navigation carried the rights of transit pas-
sage.1 1
2
d. The Canadian Straits
The determination of whether the Northwest Passage is an
"international strait" hinges on the number and character of
transits necessary in order to meet the functionality element of
the test laid out in the Corfu Channel Case.1 Indeed, there is
debate over whether a single transit will satisfy this element." 4
The Corfu Channel Case does not set a level of actual use that is
110. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 3 (describing how right of transit passage
would allow vessels to traverse through territorial waters of foreign States freely, so long
as there was right of transit passage prior to enclosure of as territorial seas); see also
Rothwell, supra note 23, at 350-51 (examining effect of transit passage and how this
right would affect Northwest Passage if it were to be declared international strait).
111. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 37, 38 (creating right of transit passage,
whereby vessels which previously would enjoy innocent passage on international strait
would now enjoy freedom of navigation between one part of high seas, or one EEZ, and
another). See generally THEUTENBERG, supra note 64, at 11 (discussing UNCLOS and the
rights of transit passage to all shipping vessels and aircraft).
112. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 34-44 (failing to describe elements of inter-
national straits, despite fully defining transit passage and legal status of straits used for
international navigation); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 368-69 (describing how
failure of UNCLOS to specify or even hint at some required amount of maritime traffic
necessary to meet functionality requirement for international straits under this test first
established in Corfu Channel Case left large amounts of ambiguity in international law
for any such analysis).
113. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 224-25 (stating that
geographic criterion would assuredly be met, but casting doubt about whether func-
tional requirement would be met); see also Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J.
4, 28-29 (Apr. 9) (describing functionality prong of this test for straits should be legally-
considered "international strait").
114. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 224-25 (asserting
that it would require more than one single transit, even more than sixteen crossings by
foreign vessels to satisfy functionality requirement); see also Corfu Channel Case, 1949
I.C.J. at 28-29 (failing to specify some actual number of transits that would be necessary
to satisfy functionality prong).
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required in order to satisfy the functionality element, as there is
very little case law that addresses this issue.115 Despite these
problems, to determine whether Canada has sovereignty over
the Passage it is very important to determine whether the North-
west Passage is an international strait.1 16
Since 1903, when the first transit of the Northwest Passage
was made, there have been less than fifty completed transits.'
17
Of these transits, only sixteen were made by foreign vessels and
few were for commercial use." 8 The level of traffic present in
the Corfu Channel Case was a great deal more than is present in
the Northwest Passage, raising the question of whether such in-
frequent use could meet the functionality requirement for an
international strait.1 9 The functionality requirement laid out in
115. See Pharand, The Northwest Passage in International Law, supra note 116, at 107
(arguing that ICJ required not only that strait in question must functionally be used as
such, but also that volume of traffic was important, as strait in question must be useful
for international maritime traffic, and suggesting that said sufficiency of use is deter-
mined by amount of ships using strait and number of States sending vessels through
strait in question); see also ELIAN, supra note 94, at 98-99 (describing how ICJ ruled
mainly based on geographic position of Corfu Channel).
116. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 224-25 (arguing that
functional criterion of Corfu Channel Case is not met in Northwest Passage situation due
to there only being forty-five completed transits of Northwest Passage in eighty years,
twenty-nine of which were by Canadian vessels); see also Donat Pharand, The Northwest
Passage in International Law, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 107 (1979) (discussing importance
of whether Northwest Passage is considered international strait).
117. See Pharand, The Northwest Passage in International Law, supra note 116, at 110-
12 (discussing some actual transits that have occurred through Northwest Passage); see
also PHARAND, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS OF THE WORLD, supra note 20, at 110-11 (address-
ing number of transits through Northwest Passage and circumstances surrounding
many of these transits, such as transit of Manhattan).
118. See Pharand, The Northwest Passage in International Law, supra note 116, at 110-
12 (discussing actual transits that have occurred through waters of Northwest Passage).
See generally PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 224-25 (describing
number of transits through Northwest Passage and circumstances surrounding many of
these transits, such as Manhattan's transit).
119. Over 2880 ships traveled the Corfu Channel in 1936-1937, whereas only forty-
five ships traveled the Northwest Passage between 1903 and 1985. See Corfu Channel Case,
1949 I.C.J. at 28 (detailing amount of ship traffic on Corfu Channel during 1936-37); see
also Pharand, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 224-25 (discussing extremely
small number of transits of Northwest Passage during past eighty-two year span). Some
interpretations of the Corfu Channel Case bolsters the Canadian claim that the Northwest
Passage is not an international strait due to the low number of record transits by other
States, particularly the United States. See generally Krauss et al., supra note 5 (highlight-
ing potential benefits of navigable Arctic waters, but noting how transits of Northwest
Passage have been infrequent at best, and how legal claims and disputes there are hard
to predict or anticipate).
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the Corfu Channel Case is so ambiguous that commentators be-
lieve it may be hard to determine what the requisite level of
travel is or even if it is required. 20 Compounding this ambiguity
is that the amount of transits required to meet the functional
element is fewer for Polar Regions where weather conditions re-
strict travel through the channel. 121 Other commentators argue
that due to the geographic nature of the Arctic Archipelago, the
Arctic melt may currently be increasing iceberg flow in the
Northwest Passage, making it more difficult for vessels to navi-
gate in the short term, leading to a decrease in transits, thereby
further reducing the functional utility of the Northwest Pas-
sage. 122
The ICJ, in the Corfu Channel Case, makes it clear that the
strait need not be a necessary route for international navigation,
but that there must have been a history of useful passage, not
just the mere possibility of this use. Several delegates from UN-
CLOS believe that functionality requires actual use, not poten-
tial use. 1 23 These delegates theorize that any use at all is suffi-
cient to satisfy the functionality prong of the international strait
test, because attempts at the conference to insert words such as
"customarily," "normally," or "traditionally" into the text on in-
120. See generally Krauss et al., supra note 5 (discussing Canadian patrolling of re-
mote Arctic regions so as to establish a strong posture in future talks over the Northwest
passage); see also Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.CJ. at 29 (listing number of transits and
history of transits made through Corfu Channel, and assessing significance of such tran-
sits).
121. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Nor. v. Den.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser.
A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5) (analyzing functionality in Arctic region); see also PHARAND, CA-
NADA'S ARcric WATERS, supra note 20, at 217-30 (discussing functionality requirement
for international straits established in Corfu Channel Case).
122. See HASSOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 84-85 (noting studies by Canadian Ice Ser-
vice which indicate that despite overall decreases in amounts of sea ice since 1968, there
is higher year-to-year variability of amounts of sea ice); see also Rob Huebert, Climate
Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage, 2 CAN. J. oF POL'v RES. 86, 91
(2001) (stating that increases in ice flows in waters of Northwest Passage could hinder
any travel on these waterways).
123. See Satya N. Nandan & D. H. Anderson, Straits Used for International Navigation:
A Commentary on Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 60
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 159, 167-69 (1989) (discussing their view that potential use of water-
ways is insufficient, and that there must be actual use, although it does not have to
reach any predetermined level); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 354-55 (describing
his own theory alongside theories of S. N. Nandan, D. H. Anderson, both delegates at
UNCLOS, and Tommy Koh, President of UNCLOS Commission from 1981-1982, that
mere potential use of straits is insufficient for straits to meet some functionality require-
ment).
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ternational straits were all rejected. 124 Tommy Koh, President of
UNCLOS, agrees, and further argues that because UNCLOS
provisions dealing with transit passage in international straits
adopt the same interpretation of straits as used in the 1958 Con-
vention, to which the United States adheres, only a functional
requirement must be met. 125
Based on commentary and analysis of the Corfu Channel
Case, it seems that the number of ships, the number of different
countries using the strait, and the totality of ships that travel
through the strait in general are the most important concerns
when considering the element of functionality.'2 6 It is possible
that usage by naval vessels could be relevant to shaping the
Court's opinion as well.' 27 To be sure, the possibility that the ICJ
would ever hear the Northwest Passage dispute seems unlikely,
given the ambiguity over the required number of transits that
are necessary to satisfy the element of functionality. 2 8 The
124. See Nandan & Anderson, supra note 123, at 167-69 (discussing basis for their
theories from their experience as delegates at UNCLOS); see also Rothwell, supra note
23, at 354-55 (describing theories of these experts and underlying facts that they use to
support these theories).
125. See United States Adherence to the Law of the Sea Convention: A Compelling National
Interest: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (Prepared
Testimony of John N. Moore) (describing U.S. adoption of 1958 Convention by advice
and consent of U.S. Senate); see also Tommy B. Koh, The Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone,
Straits and Archipelagoes under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 29 MAt_AYA L. REV.
163, 178-79 (1987) (arguing that because UNCLOS provisions dealing with transit pas-
sage in international straits adopt interpretations of straits as used in 1958 Geneva Con-
vention, to which United States adheres, only some functional requirement must be
met); PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIc WATERS, supra note 20, at 217-30 (discussing possibil-
ity that some functionality requirement is only prong that is of any real concern).
126. See generally Corfu Channel Case (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 28-29 (Apr. 9)
(describing that straits should be considered international straits with right of innocent
passage if deemed useful routes for international maritime traffic); PHARAND, CANADA'S
ARCTic WATERS, supra note 20, at 219 (discussing Corfu Channel Case, specifically Court's
analysis of functionality requirement and level of use required to satisfy this prong).
127. See generally Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 28 (noting in Court's analysis of
functionality requirement, in particular any transits actually made through channel,
that British Navy regularly used Corfu Channel for eighty years, and that this channel
was also used by navies of other States); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARcTic WATERS,
supra note 20, at 219 (discussing how ICJ took note that British Navy had made transits
through Corfu Channel in its decision in Corfu Channel Case).
128. See generally Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 28 (failing to specify any actual
number of transits necessary to meet functionality requirement in future decisions of
whether straits or water passages would be considered international straits); see also
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARcriC WATERS, supra note 20, at 215-43 (discussing state of func-
tionality requirement, its ambiguity, and reasons that predicting any court's decision on
this prong is so difficult).
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United States' position is that the geographic element is clearly
met due to the fact that the Northwest Passage joins two interna-
tional seas and that the functionality element is met by the fact
that the passage has been used by a small number of interna-
tional vessels. 2 9
3. Other Claims
Canada's most famous claim to the Northwest Passage came
in 1909, when Canadian Senator Pascal Poirer laid claim to the
Canadian Arctic territories under the Sector Theory.13" This
theory has never held much weight under international law, 13
and stronger claims of sovereignty in these polar areas have been
primarily based on traditional grounds. 32 In this vein, Canada
129. See Huebert, supra note 122, at 90 (discussing U.S. and European positions
that Northwest Passage is "international strait" according to tests set forth in Corfu Chan-
nel Case, in particular U.S. assertions that any functionality requirement is met by even
some relatively small number of transits by international vessels that has taken place so
far); see also PHARAND, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS OF THE WORLD, supra note 20, at 101-18
(listing transits made by international vessels throughout history). The European Com-
munity also voiced their objections, with the United Kingdom as the communique, pro-
testing the straight baseline test, thereby challenging Canadian sovereignty. See
Huebert, supra note 122, at 91 (discussing United Kingdom's issuance of diplomatic
protest against Canada for its efforts in 1985 to enclose Arctic waters to its North by
using straight baselines).
130. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 10 (analyzing Ca-
nada's declaration, formally, that Canada had sovereignty to all territory located north
of major Canadian land mass, extending to North Pole); see also PHARAND, INTERNA-
TIONAL STRAITS OF THE WORLD, supra note 20, at 8-11 (discussing Senator Poirier's
speech in which he advocated for some Canadian statement of sovereignty over all
lands to north of Canada, extending up to North Pole). The Sector Theory is a theory,
around since at least the fifteenth century, by which Canada first claimed all territory
from mainland Canada to the North Pole, running northwards, between the 141st me-
ridian of longitude to the series of straits between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. See
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARurIc WATERS, supra note 20, at 4-11 (analyzing joint address by
House of Commons and Senate of Canada, adopting joint address by British Parlia-
ment, asking for transfer of all Arctic lands and island lying in covered territory). Ca-
nada later re-iterated this claim and specified its easternmost boundary more concretely
as lying at the 60th meridian of longitude. See id. at 8-11 (examining Sector Theory,
particularly Senator Pascal Poirier's motion in 1907).
131. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARC-rc WATERS, supra note 20, at 26-27, 42-43, 78-79
(examining, and denouncing, boundary treaties, theories of contiguity, and customary
international law as basis for Canada's claims under Sector theory); see also U.S. DEP'T.
OF STATE, Coordinate Positions for the Plot of U.S.-Russia Convention of 1867, 14 INT'L
BOUNDARY STUDY 3 (Oct. 1, 1965) (stating United States did not support any "sector
theory" claims in polar regions).
132. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 334-38 (discussing historic claims of sover-
eignty over Northwest Passage); see also Huebert, supra note 122, at 88-89 (addressing
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views its control of the Northwest Passage, and the Arctic Archi-
pelago, as a clear historical title stemming from the 1880 transfer
of territorial rights from Great Britain to Canada. 3' These
claims to the Northwest Passage are based on the acts of discov-
ery and travel by the early European explorers from the late fif-
teenth Century to the mid nineteenth Century.1 34 In addition to
the transfer from Great Britain, Canada also has a claim based
on the use of the region by Canada's Inuit population which has
inhabited much of its northern territory since before the coloni-
zation of North America.1 35 Acts of discovery and historical use
can be a valid basis for a State to claim sovereignty over territory.
Two such grounds are the theories of Historic Waters, Historic
Consolidation of Title, and the Doctrine of uti possidetis. This
Section discusses these theories and analyzes the existing inter-
national law governing similar disputes.
a. Historic Internal Waters
Historical claims stem from the principle of "first in time,
first in right," submitting either priority or duration as the
claim's basis.1 36 While historical, priority does not necessarily go
back to the first discoverer or inhabitant documented, but rather
to the first in priority with regards to the respective claimants in
Canadian claims of sovereignty which are mainly rooted in history and how this is partly
because this is likely Canada's strongest argument).
133. See Huebert, supra note 122, at 88-89 (discussing one of few statements by
Canadian Government regarding sovereignty in Arctic region in which officials in Legal
Affairs Bureau espoused Canadian view that, since 1880 deed transfer from England to
Canada, Arctic Archipelago and its waters have been Canada's internal waters); see also
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 114 (stating that in 1880, Great
Britain transferred all British territory in North America to Canada and discussing sub-
sequent expeditions Canada sent into Arctic waters to its north).
134. See Huebert, supra note 122, at 88-89 (discussing history of Canadian Arctic
archipelago); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCrIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 113-14 (pro-
viding instructions given to British explorers by Great Britain, to discover passages be-
tween Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and describing some British explorers, from Martin
Frobisher in 1576 to Franklin in 1859).
135. See Perry, supra note 25, at 673-77 (stating that evidence indicates that no-
madic Inuit have been using these Arctic waters since pre-historic time); see also La-
londe, supra note 48, at 66 (asserting that Canadian Inuit have occupied and used this
land and ice in northern Canada since "time immemorial").
136. See Andrew Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, 63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV.
225, 230 (1973) (stating that all historical claims are based on either priority or dura-
tion, priority meaning simply being their first, and also discussing different claims of
priority throughout history); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WVATERs, supra note 20,
at 98 (asserting that historic title must be based on long usage).
2007] UNCLOS AND THE ARCTIC 1615
the contemporaneous dispute. 3 7  The fact that the agrarian
population of a State has lived in a territory for centuries is a very
strong argument that the State should have sovereignty over the
territory in question.' Unlike with the theory of Consolidation
of Tide, a claim under the theory of Historic Internal Waters
does not require a sovereign to possess the land at the time of
the claim.' 39
The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case defined historic waters as
waters which are treated as internal waters, but are only treated
this way due to the existence of a historic title. 4 ' The U.S. Su-
preme Court went further in United States v. Alaska, where it laid
out several criteria that must be met in order for a historic inter-
nal waters claim to be successful under international law. 141 The
Court stated: (1) a State must exercise authority over the area in
question; (2) the authority must be exercised continuously; and
(3) other States must acquiesce to this exercise of authority. 42
Canada's argument for sovereignty under this theory starts with
its claims of control over the Arctic Archipelago.' 4 3 The effective
137. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 231 (describing how determinations of pri-
ority do not go back to beginning of history, but simply to furthest point in time that is
pertinent to disputes); see also Huebert, supra note 122, at 89 (discussing that Canadian
claims of priority, Linder auspices of theory of historic waters, would likely not succeed
in proving that waters of Arctic Archipelago are historic internal waters).
138. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 231 (describing how historical claims are
strengthened by duration, such as duration of possession); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S
ARcric WATERS, supra note 20, at 90-100 (discussing theories of historic internal waters
and historic title with regard to Canadian control of its Arctic waters and Archipelago).
139. See Sumner, supra note 8, at 1789-90 (discussing roles of historical use and
also proximity to sovereign territory in claims of historic internal waters); see also
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 97 (listing thiee criteria establish-
ing claims of historic waters, which merely require history of use or passage of time,
among other requirements).
140. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 130 (Dec. 18) (defining
"historic waters" as waters which are treated as internal waters due to historic title, as it
is defined in customary international law); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS,
supra note 20, at 92 (stating that historic waters are only such due to existence of his-
toric title).
141. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 189 (1975) (describing criteria
needed for such claims to prevail under international law); see also Perrin, supra note
22, at 149 (stating that these criteria have been adopted as international law and govern
international claims under historic waters).
142. See Alaska, 422 U.S. at 189-90 (summarizing and applying criteria described in
previous case law); see also Perrin, supra note 22, at 149 (discussing criteria laid out in
Alaska, particularly with respect to legal claims by States that waters were "historic inter-
nal waters").
143. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 334 (discussing Canada's claims of sovereignty
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control doctrine is often viewed as the strongest legal claim to
territory, and essentially requires that a country possess uncon-
tested administrative control of the land and its resident popula-
tion. 4
4
Some of the earliest arguments for Canadian control stem
from the English and French explorers who voyaged through
the Arctic waters during their travels.' 45 These voyages give rise
to a "first in time, first in right" discovery claim. 146 In particular,
explorer Robert McClure traversed the Northwest Passage, using
both the land and water, between the years 1850 to 1854.147
One factor unique to the Arctic region with respect to this
argument is that effective control varies depending on the utility
of the land. 4 ' Pursuant to this argument, a desert or Arctic ter-
rain does not require the same degree of continuous habitation
over Northwest Passage, in particular its control and use of Arctic Archipelago and its
surrounding waters); see also Huebert, supra note 122, at 88-89 (analyzing Canadian
sovereignty over Arctic Archipelago and how this relates to and affects its sovereignty
over waters surrounding and between these islands).
144. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228 (discussing legal principles of effective
control, also noting that, legally, no new prescription of territory can be made without
abandonment of title by previously controlling State); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at
1787-92 (analyzing claims of effective control and citing principles in general property
law of possession being most of ownership as evidence that claims of effective control
are some of strongest legal claims to territory).
145. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228-29 (discussing Canada's argument for
effective control); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1787-78 (analyzing ICJ's territorial
dispute jurisprudence).
146. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 334 (discussing such claims and their basis on
which State was there first, meaning which State discovered areas and which State has
used areas for longer duration); see also Perrin, supra note 22, at 147-52 (analyzing Ca-
nadian claims of sovereignty over Northwest Passage under both historic internal waters
and historic consolidation of title, particularly analyzing cession from sovereigns, in this
case European States and Inuit populations).
147. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 334 (discussing early discovery and exploration
that took place during this time period in Canadian Arctic); see also Robert McClure Finds
the Northwest Passage, Library and Archives Canada, http://www.collectionscanada.ca/
2/24/h24-1840-e.html (describing Sir Robert John Le Mesurier McClure's original
transit of Northwest Passage, completed in 1850).
148. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228 (citing case dealing with dispute in Sa-
hara Desert between Morocco and Algeria over whether because region is uninhabit-
able there could be no effective control in this region); see also Perrin, supra note 22, at
151-53 (discussing cession from native peoples, such as in Western Sahara Case, where ICJ
left open possibility of native people transferring title to barren lands); Thomas W.
Donovan, The Marouini River Tract and its colonial legacy in South America, 4 CHi.-KENTJ.
IN-r'L & CoMP. L. 1, 10 (2004) (analyzing ICJ Eastern Greenland decision awarding
Denmark territory in question despite very limited occupation due to Arctic territory
being "so remote and virtually inaccessible").
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and control of the land as more heavily trafficked territory.149
Demonstrating effective control in more desirable land is
achieved through continuous and lasting occupation of the terri-
tory as well as through remaining the administrator of law over
the territory, with settlement of land and extraction of natural
resources from the territory other possible indicators. 5 °
Canada has attempted to strengthen its claims of control
over the Arctic, and one such act of control was Canada's passing
of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act ("AWPPA" or the
"Act") in 1970.151 This Act furthered Canada's jurisdictional
claim over the Arctic waters by allowing it to enforce anti-pollu-
tion laws on vessels passing through the Arctic. 52 It established
a 100-mile pollution control zone measured outward from the
nearest Canadian land, within which environmental controls to
shipping practices and the protection of the marine environ-
ment were to be enforced by Canada. 153 Under the Act, Canada
could prescribe standards for vessel construction, navigation,
149. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228 (citing case of Sahara Desert and argu-
ment that uninhabitable regions should have less stringent requirements for effective
control because ability to live is extremely difficult); see also Western Sahara Case, 1975
I.CJ. 12, 36-61 (Oct. 16) (analyzing whether land of Western Sahara Desert could be
transferred by local nomadic tribes to Spain and whether levels of habitation were fac-
tors to be considered relevant).
150. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 229 (setting forth effective control implying
.continuous administration" and "effective occupance" of territory); see also Sumner,
supra note 8, at 1787-88 (identifying Professors' Burghardt, Blum, and Hill opinions
that administration of political and military control over territory or resource exploita-
tion as important factors in demonstrating effective control).
151. See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 543 (1970) [hereinafter AVWPPA] (declaring Canada's control over its northern wa-
ters for purposes of preventing pollution in region); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, at
61 (stating that Prime Minister Trudeau's Government adopted measures to strengthen
Canada's position in Arctic).
152. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 339-40 (discussing effects of AWNPPA, which was
passed by Canada in 1970, following transit of U.S. ship, Manhattan, through Northwest
Passage, in effort to exert more control in that region and in Canada's northern wa-
ters); see also Huebert, supra note 122, at 92 (examining Canadian enactment of
AWApPA, which created 100-mile environmental protection zone within Canadian waters
allowing Canada to forbid discharge of fluids into these waters and which requested
registration with Canadian Government for any transit through these waters).
153. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 33940 (discussing measures taken by Canada
following voyage of U.S. ship, Manhattan, through Northwest Passage, in particular pas-
sage of AWAPPA, which included establishment of one hundred mile wide pollution con-
trol zone); see also John Kirton & Don Munton, The Manhattan Voyages and Their After-
math, in POLITICS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE (1987) (examining AWPPA and its effects
on disputes and sovereignty issues concerning Northwest Passage).
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and operation for ships traveling through its coastal waters.'54
Canada argued that this legislation was necessary because of the
danger posed by oil tankers that could spill their contents and
permanently damage the fragile Arctic environment.155
Fearing that the ICJ might not agree with the legitimacy of
the Act and the control it gave Canada over the disputed waters,
Canada withdrew its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ regarding matters dealing with Canada's Arctic sover-
eignty.'56 By doing this, Canada could choose to test validity of
its territorial claims and the validity of AWPPA in front of the ICJ
at its volition, while in the interim appearing to demonstrate ef-
fective control over the Arctic waters. 157
While Canada could argue that it has had and does have
exclusive control over the Northwest Passage, several arguments
have been made on the contrary. First, Canada has exercised
little and fairly erratic control over its northern waters, as evi-
denced by the 1985 Canadian Government statement that no
previous Canadian government had ever defined the specific
boundaries of its internal waters or territorial sea.'58 Addition-
154. See AWPPA, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970) (noting that in
addition to being able to set these requirements, failure to comply with these specifica-
tions gave Canada the power to prohibit transit of such vessels); see also Richard B.
Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the
Sea, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1, 1-50 (1970) (describing various restrictions and regulations that
Canada could place on vessels wishing to travel through its Arctic waters).
155. See Kirton & Munton, supra note 153 (describing reasons espoused by Canada
leading to its enactment of AWPPA); see also Huebert, supra note 122, at 92 (discussing
enactment of AWPPA which allowed Canada to forbid discharge of any fluids or solid
wastes, including oil, into Arctic Waters).
156. See Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, 9 I.L.M. 598 (1970) (withdrawing Canada's acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ regarding matters dealing with Canada's Arctic sover-
eignty); see also Canada: Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty, 24 I.L.M. 1723
(Sept. 10, 1985) (withdrawing Canada's acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ
regarding matters dealing with Canada's Arctic sovereignty). Canada also submitted
reservation to the Court in AWPPA which exempted the States from the ICJ's compul-
sory jurisdiction. See AWPPA, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970). This
reservation was later withdrawn in 1985 revision of the Act. See Revision of Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act, 1985 R.S., c.A-12.
157. See Lewis, supra note 156, at 1726 (withdrawing Canada's acceptance of com-
pulsory jurisdiction of ICJ regarding matters dealing with Canada's Arctic sovereignty);
see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 339-40 (discussing three measures taken by Canadian
Government following transit through Northwest Passage, in 1969, of U.S. vessel, Man-
hattan, which were to pass AWAPPA, to extend its territorial seas to twelve miles, and to
withdraw its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ to any such dispute).
158. See Perrin, supra note 22, at 150 (discussing weaknesses of any Canadian claim
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ally, the United States has opposed any actions by the Canadian
government attempting to exert control over the Northwest Pas-
sage.' 5
9
For instance, in 1969, an oil supertanker owned by Exxon,
the Manhattan, traversed a portion of the Northwest Passage. 60
While the Manhattan was escorted by both U.S. and Canadian
icebreakers, the United States did not seek Canadian permission
for the voyage. 1 ' As a result, when the Manhattan made its sec-
ond voyage in 1970, Canada insisted on much stricter scrutiny
and control.1 62 A Canadian official was placed on board the
Manhattan's second voyage while Humble Oil, a subsidiary of Ex-
xon, had to agree to certain Canadian anti-pollution controls,
with the ultimate control during the voyage's duration given to
the captain of the accompanying Canadian icebreaker. 16' Due
in large part to the demands by Canada, the United States,
of control over region and noting that when Canadian Secretary of State for External
Affairs announced establishment of straight baselines in 1985, he stated that no previ-
ous Canadian Government had ever specified precise limits of Canada's internal waters
and territorial sea in Arctic); see also Huebert, supra note 122, at 89 (stating doubts that
any claim of historic ownership would be successful).
159. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 331-32 (stating that United States does not
claim Northwest Passage for itself, instead arguing that these waters should remain
open to international navigation); see also Lalonde, supra note 48, at 59 (describing that
United States regards these Arctic waters as res communes, or property of all subject to
acquisition and appropriation of none). But see UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 234 (sug-
gesting that even if Northwest Passage is considered international strait, Canada has
rights to apply rigorous environmental standards to such strait resulting from its loca-
tion and condition).
160. See Kirton & Munton, supra note 153 (noting that oil tanker Manhattan voy-
aged through Arctic waters, eliciting Canadian governmental response claiming territo-
rial dominion over Arctic); see also Perry, supra note 25, at 661-62 (outlining history of
transits of Northwest Passage, noting passage of Manhattan in 1969).
161. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 225 (discussing
transit of Manhattan through Northwest Passage and describing how U.S. refusal to ask
permission for transits of Manhattan and later Polar Sea led to Canadian efforts to estab-
lish baselines around Arctic Archipelago); see also Perry, supra note 25, at 661-62
(describing transit of Manhattan and Canada's response of unequivocally declaring Ca-
nadian sovereignty to its Arctic waters).
162. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 225 (discussing how
Canadian representative aboard this vessel, Captain Thomas C. Pullen, and ship itself
was escorted by Canadian icebreakerJohn A. Macdonald during transit of Manhattan); see
also Perry, supra note 25, at 661-62 (evaluating transit of Manhattan and its affront to
Canadian sovereignty).
163. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 225 (describing sec-
ond transit of Manhattan, in particular how one Canadian representative was onboard
and how Manhattan was escorted by Canadian icebreaker); see also Perry, supra note 25,
at 661-62 (discussing transit of Manhattan and its affront to Canadian sovereignty).
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again, insisted that the Passage was an international strait and
approved construction of a new, powerful ice-breaker, named
the Polar Sea.' 64 The voyage of the Polar Sea through the North-
west Passage in 1989 was another major act which the United
States intended to undercut Canadian claims of administrative
control. 16 5 The United States informed Canadian officials of the
planned transit, but did not seek Canadian permission, as was
required under the AWPPA.' 6 6 The voyages of these two ships,
along with those of foreign submarines freely patrolling beneath
the Arctic ice, 16 7 illustrate how the United States has entered the
waters of the Northwest Passage numerous times without Cana-
dian authority. 6
b. Historic Consolidation of Tide
A second argument for Canadian sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage stems from historic claims of ownership over
territorial waters, perhaps based on the historic consolidation of
title, a theory stemming from the decision of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in the Grisbadarna Case.'69 For a claim of
164. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCrIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 225 (discussing
transit of Polar Sea through Northwest Passage, which was deployed by United States
into waters to carry out oceanographic work); see also Perry, supra note 25, at 662-63
(describing voyage of the Polar Sea, where United States ignored Canada's demand that
United States seek permission for any further transits).
165. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 225 (describing how
United States, again, refused to seek Canadian permission for voyage of Polar Sea); see
also Perry, supra note 25, at 661-63 (restating that United States refused to seek permis-
sion for Polar Sea's Arctic voyage despite Canadian requests).
166. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 225 (discussing
transit of Polar Sea, including U.S. refusal to gain Canadian approval beforehand); see
also Perry, supra note 25, at 661-63 (restating that United States refused to seek permis-
sion for Polar Sea's Arctic voyage despite Canadian requests). The transit of the Polar
Sea was directly followed by the drawing of straight baselines around the Canadian Arc-
tic Archipelago, which enclosed much of the Northwest Passage. See Canada: Statement
Concerning Arctic Sovereignty, 24 I.L.M. 1723 (1985).
167. See Perry, supra note 25, at 668-69 (stating that presence of U.S. submarines in
Arctic waters surrounding Canada is biggest threat to Canadian sovereignty); see also
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 147-49 (discussing documented
passages of U.S. submarines and hinting that there likely have been many more).
168. See Perry, supra note 25, at 668-69 (detailing U.S. submarine traffic in Arctic
waters near Canada and potential consequences of these transits). But see Scott Borger-
son, Breaking the Ice Up North, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A21 (discussing role United
States should play in establishing environmentally aware Arctic policy).
169. See The Grisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, reprinted in MANLEY 0.
HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 258, 258-62 (1929)
(holding it necessary to decision that waters in question, and territory appurtenant to it
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ownership based on this theory a State must show: (1) that it
discovered the land or received transfer of title from the previ-
ous sovereign; (2) that it maintains administrative control over
the region; and (3) that there has been peaceful possession by
the natural inhabitants of the region for a long period of time. 171
Analyzing the Canadian claim under this theory, the Inuit
population of the Nunavut, formerly the Northwest Territories,
would be similar to the Swedish nationals in the Grisbadarna
Case, and their use of the water and land in these areas could be
the kind of use necessary to satisfy the third requirement of the
test.17 ' The Inuit have hunted on the ice pack over the waters of
northern Canada in a semi-permanent manner for centuries,
which may be sufficient for Canada to gain title given the harsh
conditions of the Arctic. 72 The Inuit are indigenous to the Arc-
tic and have used the ice cover of the Northwest Passage as part
of their livelihood throughout their habitation, perhaps bestow-
ing sovereignty on them and, in turn, on the State of Canada,
which would satisfy the first requirement of the test for historic
consolidation of title.' 73  International law, however, does not
called "The Bohuslan," were ceded to Sweden in 1658). For a critique on The Gris-
badarna Case, see PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 140-44 (explain-
ing how Grisbadarna Case is foundational for theory of historic consolidation of tile).
170. See The Grisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, refnted in HUDSON, sura
note 169, at 258-62 (holding that demarcation of region in question, Grisbadarna, was
supported by several circumstances, including that lobster fishing had been carried on
for longer and to greater extent by Swedish fishermen, and that Sweden had performed
various acts of dominion and control in this region while Norway admitted it had not);
see also Fisheries Case (U.K v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116, 138-39 (Dec. 18) (discussing his-
toric consolidation and historic title with regard to this dispute over Norwegian coast-
line and surrounding waters).
171. See The Grisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, reprinted in HUDSON, sulra
note 169, at 258-62 (detailing how Swedish nationals had long history of lobster fishing
in shoals of Grisbadarna, whereas Norwegian nationals had fished these waters for rela-
tively much shorter period of time); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARcrIc WATERS, supra
note 20, at 140-44 (analyzing Grisbadarna Case with respect to historic consolidation of
title, particularly noting importance ICJ placed on nature of activity by Swedish nation-
als in Grisbadarna region).
172. See Johnston, supra note 46, at 147 (articulating that Inuit have lived and
hunted in Arctic for extended period of time); see also Perrin, supra note 22, at 151-53
(noting potential Canadian claims of sovereignty based on Inuit's presence in waters of
Northwest Passage).
173. See The Grisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, reprinted in HUDSON, supra
note 169, at 258-62 (holding that cession from previous sovereigns is one definitive
criteria in such decisions); see also Johnston, supra note 46, at 147 (discussing historic
consolidation of title and how Inuit in northern Canada could possibly establish Cana-
dian usc and control in this region over long duration); Perrin, supra note 22, at 151-53
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clarify whether indigenous persons have the ability to possess or
transfer titles to land. 74 Other than a transfer of title from the
Inuit, Canada instead acquired title to its northern territories
largely through discovery by English and French explorers,
which would also satisfy the first requirement of the test for his-
toric consolidation of title. 75 Similar to a claim of historic wa-
ters, however, there may be problems with any Canadian claim
of administrative control over the region due to the presence of
the United States and the uncertainty of the boundaries of any
such Canadian control.
176
c. The Doctrine of Uti Possidetis
A third potential claim based on historic possession and use
would be based on the doctrine of uti possidetis.'7 This doctrine
allows former colonies and their subordinates to claim sover-
eignty over territory that their previous mother country pos-
sessed, absent prior consent of the parties to alter those pre-de-
(analyzing theories of historic consolidation of title and that Canada could argue that
its Inuit population are similar to that of Swedish Nationals in The Grisbadarna Case, but
also suggesting that Canada might wish to avoid this argument due to internal disputes
of ownership with its Inuit population).
174. SeeJohnston, supra note 46, at 147 (stating that arguments based on property
law, taken from postclassical international law, which state that Canadian Inuit give title
to Canada, has been largely rejected); see also Perrin, supra note 22, 151-52 (describing
how land claim settlement disputes between Canada and its Inuit threaten validity of
claims that Canadian's received valid passing of title from its Inuit and ongoing ambigu-
ity of whether native people can pass title to land).
175. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 334 (describing various discoveries of English
and French explorers of Northern Arctic territories, with majority of exportations led
by English); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 1-11 (discuss-
ing transfer of title from United Kingdom to Canada, along with other discovery and
history of what is now Canadian territory).
176. See Perrin, supra note 22, at 150 (observing that U.S. failure to recognize Ca-
nada's sovereignty over Northwest Passage, and unclear history of Canada's claims re-
gionally hamper Canada's ability to base their claim in history); see also PHARAND, CA-
NADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 252 (describing weaknesses of any Canadian
claim of sovereignty over Northwest Passage under theories of historic waters or historic
title due to Canada's failure to exercise exclusive control over this region and due to
other States, including United States, not acquiescing to such control).
177. SeeJOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 7-8 (explaining that uti possidetis roughly translates to "as
you possess, so you possess", hailing from Roman law doctrine grew through Spanish
Empire's withdrawal from Latin America); see also Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v.
Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566 (Dec. 22) (describing that importance of this principle is that
it intends to validate boundaries which existed when States gained independence).
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lineated boundaries. 78 While violence has not erupted in the
Arctic region, the doctrine of uti possidetis is problematic due to
ambiguous territorial control by other States, including Britain
and France.1 79 During the colonial era, boundary lines were arti-
ficially created across territories without regard to the ethnic
composition of inhabitants and often without specifically demar-
cating the exact territorial boundaries.8 ° These ambiguities
often lead to either internal conflicts amongst the post-coloniza-
tion territory inhabitants or between States' disputing their terri-
torial boundaries.' For example, in The Frontier Dispute Case,
two African States requested that the ICJ should not disregard
the borders created through colonization because these types of
frontiers were frequently intangible and, therefore, the Cham-
ber should not disregard the principle of uti possidetis. 8 2 The
Court found the principle of uti possidetis to be deeply embedded
within international law due to decolonization and States gain-
ing independence.83 With respect to Canada's claim under this
178. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 7-8 (allowing that many colonies
gained their territory through this principle at time of independence during
decolonization period); see also Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 554 (phrasing dispute in its
simplest terms as uncertainty of frontiers inherited by each State from their colonial
predecessors).
179. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 7-8 (discussing uti possidetis as
basis for territorial claims, particularly how territory to which colonial powers had title
are transferred entirely to subsequent sovereigns); see also Frontier Dispute, 1986 L.C.J. at
568 (stating that once new State acquires its independence it gains its land with territo-
rial boundaries which existed at time that territory was colonial).
180. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 7, 21-24 (explaining that one of
many problems with theory of uti possidetis is failure to account for ethnic and cultural
differences pre-existing colonization); see also Frontier Dispute, 1986 L.C.J. at 564-67 (illus-
trating importance of this principle is ambiguity concerning territorial ownership
passed on to former colony with its newfound sovereignty in that these two States only
shared international boundary at moment of independence as both Mali and Burkina
Faso had been part of French West Africa and had no prior need for territorial delinea-
tion).
181. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 7-8 (discussing problems associ-
ated with post-colonization territory inhabited by numerous ethnicities and cultures);
see also Frontier Dispute, 1986 L.C.J. at 564-67 (noting that both States' disputes stem from
"process of decolonization," luckily both parties agreed to submit this dispute for reso-
lution as opposes to non-violent manner).
182. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 565 (stating that these two parties cannot
ignore principles of uti possidetis, whose application is responsible for territorial uncer-
tainty in first place); see also CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 21-22, 125-30,
(discussing Frontier Dispute case, particularly Court's backing of principles of uti possidetis
in its decision).
183. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 L.C.J. at 565 (explaining that "[ilts obvious purpose is
to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal
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doctrine, the relevant history is as follows. Canada became a
confederation in 1867,184 and through an 1880 Order-in-Coun-
cil, Great Britain transferred all the British possessions on the
North American continent.1
8 5
B. International Law Governing Hans Island
As recently as July 2005, Canadian Defense Minister Bill
Graham re-asserted Canadian sovereignty over Hans Island. 86
The recent dispute over Hans Island may signal that States are
increasingly trying to strengthen their territorial claims in the
Arctic region in order to capitalize on its growing accessibility
and resources.18 Although the dispute could be settled by the
ICJ, it is questionable whether the Court will ever hear the case,
as Canada withdrew from the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction on
September 10, 1985.188 This prevents the Court from deciding
struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the ad-
ministering power"). For more information on uti possidetis, see CASTELLINO & ALLEN,
supra note 177, at 7-27 (discussing theory of uti possidetis and explaining its foundations
and its advantages and disadvantages).
184. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 335 (describing Confederation's desire and
effort to assure legal title over its territory, also illustrating how Canada also purchased
part of modern day North-lWestern Territory from Hudson's Bay Company in 1869 in
order to further clarify its title to land during early stages of its confederation); see also
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 1243 (discussing Canada's his-
tory, particularly its transfer of title from Great Britain and various conventions and
agreements that might have effect on its claims of sovereignty over Northwest Passage).
185. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 335 (stating that this territory included all Brit-
ish territories and possessions in North America not already included within Dominion
of Canada and all islands adjacent to any of such territories or possessions); see also
PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 252, 255 (discussing that Cana-
dian claims of sovereignty over Northwest Passage under theory of historic waters go
back to Great Britain's 1880 transfer of tide to Canada).
186. See CTV.cA NEWS STAFF, supra note 32 (reporting on Defense Minister Bill
Graham's statements that Canada's assertions of sovereignty over Hans Island were im-
portant for more reasons and had more far reaching implications than simply who
controlled the tiny rock); see also Canada Has Claim to Hans Island: Pettigrew, CANADIAN
PRESS, Aug. 20, 2005 http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/2005
0820/hans-island-pettigrew_050819/20050820/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (describing
Graham's trip to Hans Island in 2005, which was officially protested by Denmark's gov-
ernment).
187. See Thorne, supra note 11 (positing that as global warming melts Arctic ice it
could potentially open valuable oil and mineral deposits for exploitation, which might
explain intensification of Canada and Denmark's dispute over Hans Island); see also
CANADIAN PRESS, supra note 186 (including views by Professor H. Scott Fairley, longtime
law professor at Osgoode Hall who notes importance of being able to protect State's
sovereignty).
188. See Lewis, supra note 156 (discussing how Canada withdrew its previously
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the fate of either Hans Island or the Northwest Passage without
an explicit agreement from Canada.t"9
1. Historic Claims
The theory of historic consolidation of title is one theory
that could be raised before the ICJ as grounds for the Canadian
claim of sovereignty over Hans Island. 190 To prevail on a claim
based on this theory, a State must show several things: (1) dis-
covery of the land (or transfer of title from the previous sover-
eign); (2) that it has administrative control over the region; and
(3) that there has been peaceful possession by the natural inhab-
itants of the region for a long period of time.' 91 The analysis of
the first requirement in relation to Hans Island is unlike the
analysis with respect to the dispute over the Northwest Passage,
because there was no transfer of title from a previous sovereign,
as there are no people that live on the island. 9 2 Therefore, to
given permission for ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction over disputes concerning Canada, in
1985, at same time it established its straight baselines around its Arctic Archipelago, in
large part to keep any dispute over Northwest Passage or surrounding areas from reach-
ing halls of ICJ); see also Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice, supra note 156 at 598 (withdrawing Canada's ac-
ceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ regarding matters dealing with Canada's
Arctic sovereignty fifteen years prior to its withdrawal in 1985).
189. See Lewis, supra note 156 (explaining that for ICJ to hear such dispute, parties
must first submit to Court's authority); see also Canadian Declaration Concerning the
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, supra note 156 at 598
(disallowing ICJ from deciding any dispute regarding Canada's Arctic Waters unless
Canada were to submit to its authority).
190. See The Grisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, also found in HUDSON,
supra note 169, at 258-62 (stating that one crucial factor for determining title to terri-
tory would be cession from its sovereign); see also Decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion in the Matter of the Maritime Boundary Dispute between Norway and Sweden, Award of 23
October 1909, 4 AM. J. Ir'L L. 226 (1910) [hereinafter Maritime Boundary Dispute].
For the original French version, see 121 Hague Ct. Rep. at 487, 11 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
155.
191. See The Crisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, reprinted in Hudson, supra
note 169, at 258-62 (describing factors that led this Court to its decision, where it relied
heavily on sovereign's cession of land to Sweden and Sweden's exercising much greater
degree of dominion and control over this territory, as well); see also Decision of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration in the Matter of the Maritime Boundary Dispute between Norway and
Sweden, Award of 23 October 1909, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. at 228.
192. See Howden, supra note 11, at 26 (describing Hans Island as lacking any in-
habitants). But see Kenn Harper, Hans' History: Noted Arctic Historian and Published Author
Kenn Harper Walks Us Through Hans' Past So We May Understand its Possible Future, CANA-
DIAN GEO., available at http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/hansIsland/background.asp
(last visited Jan. 28, 2007) (noting there have been hunters in this region for extended
period of time).
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satisfy this requirement, each State would have to provide evi-
dence to show that they had discovered the rock.'93 From the
1850s to the 1880s British and U.S. explorers led expeditions in
the general vicinity of Hans Island.' 94 These expeditions varied
in nature, from the pursuit of the elusive Northwest Passage,
others the North Pole, while others searched for survivors of
British explorer John Franklin's 1845 expedition. 9 5 In 1871,
U.S. explorer Charles Francis Hall, sailing for the North Pole
with Greenlander Hans Hendrik as his hunter and guide, no-
ticed the tiny island between Ellesmere Island and the Green-
land Coast, unnamed on maps made by earlier U.S. explorer Eli-
sha Kent Kane.' 96 Hall named this island "Hans Island" after his
guide, and the name first appears on a map published in
1874.197
The second requirement for a claim under historic consoli-
dation of title is that the sovereign must show that it has adminis-
trative control over the region. 9 " Both Canada and Denmark
have taken measures in recent years to attempt to demonstrate
193. See The Grisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, 258-62 (discussing how dis-
covery impacts claims of historic consolidation of tide); see also Fisheries Case (U.K v.
Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138-39 (Dec. 18) (listing as bases for historic title either transfer
from sovereign or discovery).
194. See Harper, supra note 192 (describing early exploration of Arctic, upon which
European explorers assuredly passed this island, but noting that George Nares's British
expedition in 1875 occurred after this island had already been named, by U.S. citizen,
after one Greenlandic Inuit individual); see also Robert McClure Finds the Northwest Passage,
supra note 147 (recounting Sir Robert McClure's journey through Canadian Arctic wa-
ters, including expanses of Northwest Passage).
195. See Harper, supra note 192 (describing that this island was named Hans Island, by
U.S. explorer Charles Francis Hall, during his exploration through Kennedy Channel in 1871 on
Polaris); see also Whose Hans? A Border Dispute Between Denmark and Canada Over a Tiny
Kidney-Shaped Island at the Top of the World, The Hans of Time, CANADIAN GEO., available at
http://canadiangeographic.ca/hansisland/default.asp (discussing Charles Hall and his
"ill-fated" ship, Polaris).
196. See Harper, supra note 192 (discussing exploration by Charles Francis Hall that led to
naming Hans Island); see also Whose Hans?, supra note 195 (noting that Hall passed
through Kennedy Channel and noticed an unnamed island on his map).
197. See Harper, supra note 192 (discussing how Hall named island after member of his
expedition who was Greenlandic Inuit and also had worked as guide for previous U.S. expeditions
of Greenland); see also Whose Hans?, supra note 195 (noting 1874 as first published map
with "Hans Island" specifically labeled).
198. See The Grisbadarna Case, 121 Hague Ct. Rep. 130, reprinted in HUDSON, supra
note 169, at 258-62 (deeming it important that Sweden had exercised almost unfettered
control in The Grisbadarna); see also Fisheries Case, 1951 I.CJ. at 138-39 (listing require-
ments for establishing baselines and for historic title, including by way of historic con-
solidation of title).
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effective control over Hans Island and the surrounding seas.
Denmark sent fighter jets over the island in 1983, and in 1984
the Danish Minister for Greenland chartered a helicopter to the
island. 9' On the other hand, in 2004, Canada conducted a
US$4 million dollar military exercise in the Arctic to reinforce its
claims to Arctic sovereignty, part of which was a patrol by Cana-
dian troopers, who hammered metal plaques into the rocks of
Hans Island, claiming it as Canadian.2 11 It is unclear how these
actions might affect the claim of administrative control, as a de-
pendence on plaques does not make a strong case for sover-
eignty, which Great Britain learned in the Falklands Islands.20 1
The third requirement to establish a claim under historic consol-
idation of title is that the State must show that there has been
peaceful possession of the territory by its natural inhabitants for
a long period of time. 0 z The strongest argument for this ele-
ment being satisfied is the fact that, since the Fourteenth Cen-
tury, the people of northwestern Greenland have historically
used the area surrounding Hans Island as part of their tradi-
tional hunting grounds.20 3
199. See Hans Island, supra note 29 (documenting recent Danish efforts to demon-
strate control in Hans Island, or at least reiterate sovereign interest therein in Hans
Island); see also CANADIAN PRESS, supra note 186 (explaining that Hans Island was discov-
ered by Britain, ceded to Canada, appearing on Canadians maps, and then home to
scientific research stations).
200. See Clifford Krauss, Canada Reinforces Its Disputed Claims in the Arctic, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, (summarizing various actions by both Canada and Denmark
which were aimed at establishing control and sovereignty over Hans Island and its sur-
rounding waters); see also Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228-29 (describing how Canada
placed one plaque on Hans Island, and discussing its potential value in claiming effec-
tive control over Hans Island, in part due to its central location in Arctic region).
201. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 229, n.23 (citingJ.CJ. Metford, Falklands or
Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute, 44 INT'L AFF. 463, 463-81 (1968)) (noting that
cost of occupation led Britain to withdraw their military presence in Falkland Islands,
but claimed effective control through presence of plaques).
202. See PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS, supra note 20, at 95 (discussing his-
tory of historic waters theory and necessary elements of claim of historic consolidation
of title, which includes requirement that there have been State activities in this area
over long period of time); see also Fisheries Case, 1951 I.CJ. at 138-39 (pointing out that
peaceful possession of territory by natural inhabitants is required to establish historic
consolidation of title).
203. See Harper, supra note 192 (noting that peaceful and uninterrupted hunting
may meet requisite level required within historic consolidation of title analysis); see also
Johnston, supra note 46, at 147 (explaining general theory and possibility that extended
hunting by indigenous people may give rise to claims under historic consolidation of
title).
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2. Claims Under UNCLOS
In their attempts to claim sovereignty over Hans Island, ei-
ther State might base its argument on the international law codi-
fied in UNCLOS.204 Article 121(3) of UNCLOS explains that
rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.20 5 Since Hans Island might be considered a "rock" under
UNCLOS, a determination of the EEZs2°6 of both Canada and
Greenland in the region could have a significant effect on the
outcome of the dispute between the two States, if either were to
comprise Hans Island.
Article 56 of UNCLOS provides that within the EEZ, the
coastal State has the exclusive right to explore, exploit, and gen-
erally manage the natural resources of the waters superjacent to
the sea-bed and of the sea-bed itself.20  UNCLOS places a limit
on the breadth of the zones, however, stating that they should
204. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 121 (barring rocks that are unable to "sus-
tain human habitation" or at least "economic life" from having individual EEZ); see also
THEUTENBERG, supra note 64, at 13, 147 (discussing UNCLOS and Article 121 limita-
tions on establishing EEZs).
205. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 121(3) (setting forth criterion for which land
area will be deemed "a rock" and be denied benefits of an EEZ); see also THEUTENBERG,
supra note 64, at 13, 147 (remarking on Article 121 and its bar on granting EEZs to
islands incapable of sustaining "human habitation" or "economic life").
206. UNCLOS defines a country's Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") as:
[A]n area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific
legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of
the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by
the relevant provisions of this Convention.
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 55; see also ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEW
OCEAN REGIME 33 (1993) (writing about negotiations between UNCLOS delegates, in-
cluding United States, which led, in part, to inclusion of EEZs within UNCLOS).
207. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 56 (explaining what rights States shall pos-
sess within its EEZ). For an interesting parallel to the current tension between Canada
and Denmark concerning Hans Island, particularly when the potentially enormous
value of the EEZ raises the ante, see Larry Rohter, 25 Years After War, Wealth Changes
Falklands, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007 (discussing Britain's decision after the 1982 Falk-
lands Islands War between Great Britain and Argentina to allow Falkland Government
to declare 200-mile EEZ, thereby allowing Falkland Islanders to reap fish-abundant re-
wards of icy sea adding revenue of approximately US$88 million dollars per year).
Great Britain had been hesitant to grant the Falkland Government the right to declare
the EEZ for fear of angering Argentina, who has never acquiesced its claim to the Falk-
lands. Rohter notes that relations between the two States have recently worsened as a
result of the EEZ, noting that Argentina has mostly banned flights headed to or from
the Falklands and that current Argentinian President N~stor Kirchner has grown in-
creasingly nationalistic about the Falklands. Id.
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not exceed 200 nautical miles from the State's coastal base-
lines. 2°8 These economic zones are seen as limits on the distance
of the continental shelf.2 '" The establishmnent of EEZs under
UNCLOS limits the extension of the continental shelf area of a
State, but also allows States to claim control over seas surround-
ing its shores when the continental shelf does not extend very
far.2 10 Despite the potential benefits of claiming that Hans Is-
land lies within the EEZ of one of the States, both States might
claim overlapping EEZs, a dispute that might have to be worked
out through negotiation, as is required by countries with over-
lapping claims over continental shelves.21'
3. Geography
Another factor that may influence the outcome of the dis-
pute over Hans Island is geographic features, such as mountains,
oceans, islands, and rivers create natural borders, which the ICJ
has previously considered when crafting decisions.21 2 These nat-
ural borders have been used to form land claims, either in com-
bination with or independent of other theoretical bases for
claiming territory.21 3 At least one scholar argues that perhaps
208. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 57 (defining territorial limits that can be
claimed as EEZ); see also THEUTENBERG, supra note 64, at 20-23 (summarizing codifica-
tion of EEZ under UNCLOS).
209. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76 (explaining how EEZs, in most cases, set
limits of continental shelves); see also THEUTENBERG, supra note 64, at 20-23 (analyzing
particular rights States possess within EEZs, such as scientific and oceanographic re-
search).
210. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 82 (explaining exceptions to Article 76 so
that continental shelves may extend further under certain circumstances, for instance
Article 82 calls for coastal States who exploit resources over continental shelves, but
beyond 200 mile limit to make payments which would be distributed on equitable basis
to other States which are parties to UNCLOS); see also Oxman, supra note 102, at 832-34
(discussing President Harry S. Truman's claim to Continental Shelf in 1945, starting
rapid evolution of UNCLOS and international law involving ocean).
211. See Krauss et al., supra note 5, at 13 (explaining that negotiations are required
when States have overlapping claims to continental shelves); see also UNCLOS, supra
note 24, arts. 55-83 (defining both EEZs and delimitation of States' continental shelves,
as well as explaining rights and duties of each States relating to both EEZs and conti-
nental shelves).
212. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 236 (commenting that natural geographic
features have been used by ICJ in deciding territorial disputes); see also Sumner, supra
note 8, at 1781-84 (explaining how ICJ decisions have, throughout history, used geogra-
phy, particularly natural territorial boundaries, to resolve disputes over territory).
213. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 240 (describing how these natural borders
have been used to establish stand alone territorial claims, or used in combination with
other theories of territorial claims); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1795-96, 1800-
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geographical delimitation commands more respect than more
historically-rooted and effectively controlled claims. 214  Despite
the fact that geographical features do not necessarily alter the
respective States' claims to Hans Island, as Hans Island does not
present a territorial integrity issue for either Canada or Den-
mark, the ICJ has, in the past, used non-legal arguments to solve
disputes and might take any geographic factors, such as the
proximity to each State, into consideration.215
C. International Law Governing Russia's Claims
As previously mentioned, the Commission's evaluation of
the Russian claim to nearly half of the Arctic Ocean will be con-
tingent upon verification of the seismic mapping of the claimed
area by the Commission.216 Under UNCLOS, a State has sover-
eignty over its continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting its natural resources, a right which is exclusive to that
State.2 1 7 A State's continental shelf is defined as "comprising the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas" along the natural
extension of its territory out to the "edge of the continental mar-
01 (examining how natural boundaries have affected ICJ decisions in conjunction with
other reasoning).
214. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 236 (describing how Britain has possessed
Mediterranean's Rock of Gibraltar on tip of Iberian mainland for several centuries, yet
United Nations voted in 1968 that Britain should transfer Gibraltar to Spain, Burghardt
thereby illustrating apparent weight Spain's geographic proximity is given over territory
that has historically been effectively controlled by Great Britain); Sumner, supra note 8,
at 1783-84 (characterizing geographic demarcation as "psychological").
215. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969
I.CJ. 3, 30-31 (Feb. 20) (arguing that while not found to be inherent rule at interna-
tional law, proximity, in some general sense, may be used as part of analysis regarding
conflicting land claims); see also CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 127 (noting
that while legal doctrine shapes decisions, equity may also factor into ICJ decisions).
216. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 970 (describing how this Commission reviews
information submitted by coastal States and then makes recommendations to States
regarding delimitation of its continental shelf); see also Golovko, supra note 38, at I
(stating that due to discrepancies noted in Russia's submission by several U.N. Member
States, Russia must revise its submission addressing such discrepancies before any deci-
sion can be reached by Commission).
217. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 77 (stating that States may extract natural
resources that consist of minerals and other non-living resources of seabeds and that
sovereign rights of coastal States to exploit natural resources are exclusive, and even if
coastal States do not utilize natural resources, no other State may attempt to utilize
those natural resources absent express consent); see also FRIEDHEIM, supra 206, at 78-81
(discussing Russia's positions and objectives in negotiating UNCLOS).
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gin" or up to "200 nautical miles from the baselines. ' 218 With
baselines as a primer, the State can establish the outer limits of
its continental shelf to either a limit not exceeding 350 nautical
miles from such baselines, 219 or a limit not exceeding 100 nauti-
cal miles from the 2500 meter isobath. 220 Because the delibera-
tions of the Commission are confidential, the United States, as a
non-signatory, is unable to influence the interpretation and ap-
plication of the aforementioned provisions. 22
1
D. Options for Resolution of Dispute
1. The International Court of Justice
The ICJ provides one potential option for resolving territo-
rial disputes in the Arctic region. Article 59 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ Statute") effectively elimi-
nates the conventional notion of stare decisis, mandating that
only ICJ decisions bind the parties that submitted the case and to
that action upon the case to which the Court is deliberating.
222
The ICJ looks to re-occurring theories of territorial dispute reso-
218. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76 (detailing formula used to define State's
continental shelf). But see UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 3 (stating that territorial seas
must not exceed twelve nautical miles, measured from baselines).
219. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 5 (providing formula used to establish base-
lines). For the purposes of this section, the baseline is the "low-water line along the
coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." Id. For
more information, see BERNARD H. OXMAN, THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE NINTH SESSION (1980) 211-56 (1981) (discussing forma-
tion of and particular provisions of UNCLOS, including Article 5).
220. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76 (stating that 2500 meter isobaths are im-
aginary lines along continental shelf that are at constant depth of 2500 meters); see also
BERNARD H. OXMAN, THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
THE NINTH SESSION (1980) 211-56 (1981) (articulating mechanics of UNCLOS includ-
ing Article 76).
221. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 969; see also Richard G. Lugar, Senate Should
Ratify Law of the Sea in the Interest of Our National Defense, NAvy TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004,
available at http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/opeds.html (explaining that without ratifying
UNCLOS, United States will be unable to oppose Russian claims); Caitlyn L. Antrim,
Mineral Resources Of Stateless Space: Lessons From The Deep Seabed, INT'L AFF., Sept. 22, 2005
(arguing that operating outside of UNCLOS provisions will put United States in infer-
ior bargaining position in its current and future conflicts with UNCLOS signatories).
222. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59 Stat.
1060, [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (Article 59 states that "[tihe decision of the Court has
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case"). See
generally ELIAN, supra note 94 (discussing formation of ICJ and its history and impor-
tance for dealing with legal disputes between States); Philip V. Tisne, Note, The ICJ and
Municipal Law: The Precedential Effect of the Avena and Lagrand Decisions in U.S. Courts, 29
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 865, 876-87 (discussing the origins of ICJ).
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lution and customary international law to resolve the cases
before it. 2 2 3 In this regard, the Court does follow its own prece-
dent, and its decisions can shed light on how future decisions
might be adjudicated. 2 24
Scholars find territorial dispute resolution to derive from
treaties, geography, principles of equity (including economic ne-
cessity), effective control, history, uti possidetis, and documenta-
tion in certain instances. 225 These theories stem from the text of
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, further evidenced and expanded by
ICJ decisions resolving territorial disputes. Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute clearly mentions that treaties shall form part of the basis
of adjudicating territorial disputes within the ICJ. 2 26 Commenta-
tors argue that Article 38 not only obligates the ICJ to defer to
treaties, but that a treaty itself means that parties have decided to
let go of their historical claim and other bases of claims subject
to the agreed upon provisions of the treaty. 22 7
Canada entered into the Treaty of Paris in 1763, under
223. See ICJ Statute, supra note 222, art. 38 (identifying "international custom," as
evidence of general practice accepted as law" and "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations" as sources of law that ICJ utilizes when hearing cases). See generally
ELAN, supra note 94, at 4044, 71-132 (discussing establishment of ICJ and force, and
authority, of its opinions, both its advisory opinions and its binding opinions).
224. See ELLAN, supra note 94 (following customary international law, by no means
legally binding, ICJ helps to further shape body of customary international law and
theory by articulating what it views as critical criterion enabling postulation of how ICJ
may view cases before it). For discussion of why parties might submit to the ICJ, Beth A.
Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Arbitrations and Territorial
Disputes, 46J. CONFLICT REs. 829, 829-34 (2002) (arguing that parties submit their dis-
putes to ICJ in order to receive economic windfall stemming from political stability).
225. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228 (presenting seven categories of territo-
rial claims: effective control, historical, cultural, territorial integrity, economic, elitist,
and ideological). Sumner expanded the categorization of territorial dispute resolution
to nine, consisting of treaties, geography, economy, culture, effective control, history,
uti possidetis, elitism, and ideology. Sumner, supra note 8, at 1782-93. For the purposes
of this Note, the authors largely adopt both Sumner and Professor Burghardt's categori-
zations, but focus on seven theories that are prevalent within ICJ decisions regarding
territorial disputes that readily lend themselves to the Canadian Arctic situation.
226. See ICJ Statute, supra note 222, art. 38 (stating that treaties shall form part of
basis for resolving territorial disputes); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1782-83 (ex-
plaining that Article 38 of ICJ Statute requires Court judges to consider treaties while
crafting decisions).
227. See ICJ Statute, supra note 222, art. 38 (establishing that one method for
resolving territorial dispute may be relying on treaties); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at
1782-83 (arguing that beyond ICJ Statute obviating weight treaty will be given by ICJ,
treaty seems to trump all others and serve as evidence that treaty should command
above all other territorial theories).
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which France relinquished all claims to French territory in Great
Britain's North America with the exception of two islands.228
Russia also granted Great Britain a claim to the territorial sea in
between modern-day Alaska and the Yukon in the 1825 Bound-
ary Treaty. 229 The existence of these treaties gives rise to the
possibility that the ICJ would grant Canada sovereignty to both
Hans Island and the Northwest Passage.230
The principle of equity is an over-arching idea that the ICJ
seeks to apply throughout its decisions.23 1 Judgments are based
on the applicable international law in force, yet equitable princi-
ples may also impact the Court's decisions.23 2 In Continental
Shelf, the ICJ provided that equity and the opportunity to be
heard equally do not mean that the Court will alter results in
order to achieve territorial equality. 233 The Court, therefore, re-
228. See Treaty of Paris, Feb. 10, 1763, available at http://www.solon.org/Con
stitutions/Canada/English/PreConfederation/Treaty-ofParisI 763W (ceding all of
Canada from France to Great Britain, including Cape Breton Island and all other is-
lands in St. Lawrence River); see also Treaty of Paris (1763), The Canadian Encyclopedia,
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA
0006083.
229. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 334-35 (describing 1825 Boundary Treaty,
which established Canadian-United States border at 141st meridian and provided that
border between Alaska and Yukon extended to "Frozen Ocean"); see also Convention
between Great Britain and Russia concerning the Limits of their Respective Possessions
on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean, Feb. 16,
1825, art. 3, 75 C.T.S. 95.
230. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 334-35 (arguing that Canadian claims also are
rooted in various treaties); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIc WATERS, supra note 20, at
228 (discussing Canadian treaties in Arctic region and their possible effects on poten-
tial sovereignty disputes).
231. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 127 (articulating general princi-
ples of equity theory that ICJ may look in order to help resolve territorial disputes in
front of Court). For a case where the ICJ utilized equitable principles in its decision,
see Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. Reports 554 (Dec.
22) (holding that equity may be utilized where parties agree in order to come to fair
resolutions, but also that relevant law will be considered in conjunction with principles
of equity for any such decision).
232. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 554 (ruling that equity was applicable to dis-
putes in conjunction with international law in force). But see ICJ Statute, supra note 222,
art. 38 (stating that Courts can only apply equitable solutions if both parties agree that
Courts may implement such considerations).
233. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) 1985 I.CJ. 13, 30
(June 3) (stating that certain principles, such as geography, non-encroachment upon
neighboring States and equality between States should not necessarily be given equal
weight before court employing equity to reach solution). For a summary of Continental
Shelf, see CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 131-33 (summarizing case, particularly
with regards to delimitation of continental shelf).
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jected Malta's argument that the continental shelf should be
more favorable to Malta as opposed to Libya due to the inequity
of territorial control, economies, and the lack of natural re-
sources capable of producing energy for Malta.2 4 In the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ declared that the resolution of
a dispute between three States over a division between them of
the Continental Shelf of the North Sea would be inequitable if
divided based upon the equidistance rule described in Article 6
of the 1958 U.N. Convention on the Continental Shelf.2 3 5
While the disparity of two States' resources may not directly
impact resolving territorial disputes, equity may allow for eco-
nomic necessity in shaping decisions.236 Although applying prin-
ciples of equity appears to have limited application by the ICJ, it
seems to be an important consideration for them in any deliber-
ation over international disputes. 37
As previously mentioned, the effective control doctrine,
often viewed as the strongest legal claim to territory, essentially
means that a State possesses uninterrupted and unchallenged su-
pervision of the territory and its population. 238 Absent a third-
234. See Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. at 4142 (identifying substantive components
of principles of equity as they may be used in ICJ decisions and how principles of equity
relate to disputes concerning boundary delimitations); see also CASTELLINO & ALLEN,
supra note 177, at 131-33 (analyzing how equity played role in ICJ's decision, which was
made possible because both parties agreed that delimitation of continental shelf should
be resolved by equitable principles).
235. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.); F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3, 49-50 (Feb. 20) (reiterating that equity does not mean equality). The 1958
U.N. Convention on the Continental shelf defined the equidistance rule as "the bound-
ary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured."
United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, 499
U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter UNCCS].
236. See Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. at 13 (reading ICJ decision in Continental Shelf
Case calls into question how much weight the principle of equity would receive); see also
Burghardt, supra note 136, at 237-38 (pointing out that Commentators allow that rail-
road tracks, ports, pipelines, natural resource deposits, and shipping routes are often
claimed as economic necessities that warrant awarding sovereign undisputed territorial
control over land); Sumner, supra note 8, at 1785-86 (noting that other economic justi-
fications are asserted for territorial disputes).
237. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice ("ICJ Statute")
requires special consent for application of principles of equity to disputes in front of
the ICJ. See ICJ Statute, supra note 222, art. 38. See also Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. at 13
(discussing principle of equity and its bearing on resolving territorial disputes in front
of ICJ).
238. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228 (believing that no new legal title can be
obtained unless previous sovereign possessing territory in question had committed act
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party tribunal or party willing to enforce a different understand-
ing, effective control is a necessary requisite to the maintenance
of legal title. 939 Varying from effective control, an historical
claim does not require a sovereign to possess the land at the
time of the claim.24° Historical claims stem from the principle of
first in time, first in right, submitting either precedence or
length of time as the claim's basis.241 Historical priority does not
necessarily go back to the first discoverer or inhabitant docu-
mented, but rather to the first in priority with regards to the
respective claimants in the contemporaneous dispute.242
The natural borders established by geographical features
such as mountains, oceans, islands, and rivers,243 are used to
form land claims, either in combination or irrespective with
other theoretical bases for a sovereign claiming territory. 44 At
least one scholar argues that perhaps geographical delimitation
commands more respect than more historically-rooted and effec-
tively-controlled claims. 245 Uti possidetis, roughly translating to
explicitly abandoning land); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1787-78 (analogizing that
similar to adverse possession claim under U.S. common law).
239. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 228 (positing that effective control is re-
quired by law in order to possess legal title); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1787-88
(explaining that effective control of territory creates stronger rights to territory and
stronger claims to territory than any other factor).
240. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 230-33 (believing that strongest historical
claim is one based on territory that is viewed as State's "homeland"); see also Sumner,
supra note 8, at 1789 (providing that historical claims create basic claims to territory, no
matter whether State has actual possession of land at time of claim).
241. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 230 (referring to historical-based claims as
derived from priority or duration); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1789-90 (articulat-
ing that historical claims tend to be most common of territorial claims and are most
often based on either duration or discovery).
242. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 232 (describing that timelines for disputes
extend as far back as possible so long as that time is pertinent to existing problems); see
also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1789-90 (discussing how history and use of territory by
disputing parties may affect outcomes of such disputes in front of ICJ).
243. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 235-37 (analyzing territorial integrity as it
relates to claims of sovereignty; noting that although experts have tried to debunk con-
cepts of natural boundaries, these concepts survive as people continue to view certain
regions and lands as possessing unity or wholeness); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at
1783-84 (assessing geography's role in determining outcomes of territorial disputes in
front of ICJ).
244. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 235-37 (examining territorial integrity as it
relates to other legal claims over territory and how territorial integrity often creates
strong emotional reactions and motivations within local inhabitants and disputing par-
ties); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1783-84 (addressing geography's interplay with
other factors when judges craft ICJ decisions for territorial disputes between States).
245. See Burghardt, supra note 136, at 235-37 (suggesting that disputes which are
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"as you possess, so you possess," leaves former colonies and sub-
ordinates to pursue the sovereignty claims that their previous
"mother country" possessed, absent prior consent of the parties
to alter those pre-delineated boundaries, with numerous colo-
nies gaining their independence through this principle during
the decolonization epoch.2 4 6
The ICJ utilizes documents such as maps and treaties as evi-
dence of sovereignty. In addition to employing the baseline test
in the Fisheries Case, the Court also looked towards history and
documentation in ultimately finding for Norway.24 7 In 1959, the
ICJ held that Belgium had not ceded sovereignty to territory dis-
puted between Belgium and the Netherlands in Sovereignty over
Certain Frontier Land.2 48 One issue the Court addressed was
whether Belgium still controlled a specific territory it gained
through a boundary convention, despite failing to assert its
rights and allegedly allowing the Netherlands to assert control
intermittently over the territory in question since 1843.249 The
ICJ, in part, determined that Belgium had not abandoned sover-
eignty over the disputed territory by turning to Belgium's eviden-
tiary items such as military staff maps and survey records that
inapposite to territorial integrity create more emotional disputes and parties that are
less willing to compromise); see also Sumner, supra note 8, at 1804-12 (analyzing ICJ
jurisprudence and its justifications for decisions).
246. See Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.CJ. 554 (Dec.
22) (discussing uti possidetis, particularly how important it was in regards to disputes
over territory which had previously been colonies of sovereign States); see also CASTEL-
LINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 125-27 (describing ICJ's decision not to disregard
principle of uti possidetis, because this principle carries extra weight in areas of post-
colonization, like Africa).
247. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 L.CJ. 116, 134-39 (Dec. 18) (applying
history and documentation, in addition to application of baseline test, in arriving at its
decision); see also PHARAND, CANADA'S ARcTic WATERS, supra note 20, at 144-46 (discuss-
ing holdings of Fisheries Case and later codification of customary international law estab-
lished in that case).
248. See Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.),
1959 I.C.J. 209, 230 (June 20) (suggesting that perhaps history and documentation may
play greater roles than effective control in some instances); see also CASTELLINO & AL-
LEN, supra note 177, at 122-25 (summarizing ICJ's decision, important because it ad-
dressed issues of territorial disputes in post-colonial areas without invoking theory of uti
possidetis).
249. See Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land, 1959 I.C.J. at 227 (con-
trolling territory intermittently was insufficient for Dutch to beat Belgium documenta-
tion, according to ICJ). For more information on this case, see CASTELLINO & ALLEN,
supra note 177, at 122-25 (summarizing Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land when discussing methods and principles that State's acquire title to lands held
previously by sovereigns).
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clearly enclosed the disputed territory within the State's control,
and held for Belgium.250
In Frontier Dispute, the Court held that a principle applicable
to international territorial disputes did give significant weight to
maps in terms of evidence that express a State's notion of territo-
rial sovereignty. 251 The Court gives varying weight to maps rang-
ing from legitimate legal force that represents a State's view of its
territorial possession to a more circumstantial type of evidence
that must be coupled with other evidence in order to shape a
cogent argument.252
2. The Antarctic Treaty
Another alternative solution to the numerous Arctic territo-
rial disputes discussed here could be taken from the solution to
a similar situation on the other side of the globe, the Antarctic
Treaty.25M In 1959, the United States invited twelve States with
claims in Antarctica to a conference in Washington, D.C., which
produced the Antarctic Treaty.254 This Treaty included a key
provision, Article IV, which addressed the competing territorial
claims of all of the States that wished to assert territorial claims
250. See Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land, 1959 I.C.]. at 229-30
(believing that documentation showing territory's inclusion within Belgium, absent ex-
plicit act of abandonment, served as adequate evidence of Belgian control); see also
CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 122-25 (analyzing lCJ's evaluation of various
documentation, where ICJ assessed reliability, validity, and value of each piece of docu-
mentation).
251. Frontier Dispute, 1986 IC.J. 554 (giving weight to maps as indication of State's
supposed territorial control, but not necessarily entire story). For more information on
this case, see CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 177, at 125-30 (summarizing Frontier Dis-
pute).
252. Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. 554 (stating that maps are not always reliable or
accurate, and therefore cannot themselves constitute evidence of title to territory, but
are merely extrinsic evidence that there may be such title); see also CASTELLINO & ALLEN,
supra note 177, at 129 (quoting ICJ decision which questioned reliability of maps and
similar documentation, which by themselves, ICJ found, did not constitute territorial
title).
253. See Antarctic Treaty (Dec. 1, 1959), 12 U.S.T. 794, 42 U.N.T.S. 71 (recogniz-
ing that it would be in States' interests worldwide to suspend all territorial claims in
Antarctica and instead focus resources on exploration and scientific research in
Antarctic for benefit of all States); see also Antarctic Treaty, Antarctic Treaty Secretariat
(discussing formation of Antarctic Treaty and its pertinent components).
254. See THEUTENBERG, supra note 64, at 78-84 (discussing formation of Antarctic
Treaty, including analysis of its impact and discussion of negotiations leading up to its
formation); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 333 (describing formation of Antarctic
Treaty in 1959).
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on the continent.255 Article IV essentially suspended all of the
States' rights in Antarctica, stating that the Treaty did not act as
a renunciation of any previously asserted claims to territory on
the continent.25 6 It also made clear that no State should make
any new territorial claims in Antarctica while the Treaty was in
force.2 5 7 While the actual effect of this language was somewhat
unclear, it was important because it allowed the States to look
past any territorial disputes and focus on other important
problems facing the continent, such as pollution control, natural
resource exploitation, and scientific exploration. 258 No new sov-
ereignty disputes have arisen in Antarctica for more forty-five
years, due in large part to Article 1V. 251
The similar environmental issues, and the impact that
global warming has in both regions, might lead States to form a
similar treaty in the Arctic Circle.2 6 ° It could be advantageous
for the Arctic Rim States to hold multilateral discussions on is-
sues such as pollution control, management of wildlife, the na-
255. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 253, art. 4 (stating that nothing in said Treaty
could be interpreted as renunciation of previously asserted rights or claims by any State,
nor could any future action by parties to said Treaty constitute actions furthering such
claims); see also Bobo, supra note 254 (analyzing Article 4 of Antarctic Treaty).
256. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 253, art. 4 (stating that while Antarctic Treaty
was in place no new claim or enlargement of existing claims could be asserted by any
State); see also Bobo, supra note 254 (restating Article IV of Antarctic Treaty as example
which could be borrowed by Arctic States to resolve similar issues).
257. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 253, art. 4 (stating that all such claims were
suspended by Antarctic Treaty); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 333 (providing that
under this Treaty, sovereignty ceases to be an issue in this region for duration of this
Treaty); Bobo, supra note 254 (noting that territorial aspects of this treaty entered into
effect after all signatories ratified on June 23, 1961, while Antarctic environmental regu-
lations promulgated by 1991 Madrid Protocol have yet to be ratified by sufficient num-
ber of States).
258. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 333 (discussing Antarctic Treaty's formation
and parts of this Treaty that have been most beneficial to region and States involved);
see also Antarctic Treaty, supra note 253, art. 4 (detailing rights that would be suspended
under this Treaty to allow all signatory States to focus on important issues such as envi-
ronment).
259. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 333 (discussing Antarctic Treaty, in particular
how agreement on non-sovereignty issues has led to stability in Antarctic region and has
also prevented any sovereignty disputes from forming during its duration); see also
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 253, art. 4 (stating that certain rights and claims of sover-
eignty were suspended by this Article of Antarctic Treaty).
260. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 333 (suggesting that Arctic States could benefit
greatly from treaties or Treaty similar to Antarctic Treaty); see also Bobo, supra note 254
(explaining conditions in Arctic region that might lead to formation of such treaty).
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tive population's rights, and the law of the sea in the region.26
Although a treaty like the Antarctic Treaty would not alter
States' territorial claims and would ignore any action taken to
further one's claim to the region while the Treaty is in force,
States could enter into additional negotiations to settle certain
territorial disputes in the same treaty, or add an addendum to
the treaty.
26 2
There are already close parallels to the Antarctic Treaty in
place in the Arctic region. The first came about with the passing
of Canada's AWPPA in 1970, which is discussed more fully
above.263 The second parallel is the Arctic Cooperation Agree-
ment. 26 4 In 1988, following two years of negotiations, Canada
and the United States entered into the Agreement, which sought
to protect and develop the Arctic in a cooperative manner, while
neither side subordinated its respective positions with regard to
sovereignty. 265 Both parties acknowledged that the Agreement
did not disturb Canada's claims of sovereignty over either the
Arctic Archipelago or the Northwest Passage. 266 A third parallel
261. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 333 (suggesting that such discussions could be
advantageous to all States in region without delving into any truly contentious issues,
which might prevent any agreement); see also Bobo, supra note 254 (explaining advan-
tages for Arctic States to come to agreement over certain issues in region).
262. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 364-67 (discussing effects on signing States'
rights and their subsequent legal positions after formation of Antarctic Treaty); see also
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 253, art. 4 (suspending legal claims to territory in Antarc-
tica for duration of Treaty).
263. See AWPPA, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970) (listing each sec-
tion of AWPPA); see also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 339-40 (discussing enactment of
AWPPA, its intentions, and its effects).
264. See Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, Jan. 11, 1988, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 141 (1989) (formalizing agreement between United States and Canada to coop-
erate in advancing shared interests in Arctic navigation, development and security); see
also Scovazzi, supra note 49, at 79 (discussing how this Agreement's purpose was to
ensure that disputes over navigation rights did not affect Arctic region's unique envi-
ronment).
265. See Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, supra note 264, art. 4. Article 4 con-
tains a disclaimer that reads:
Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavor between Arctic neighbors
and friends nor any practice there under affects the respective positions of the
Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this
or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.
See also Rothwell, supra note 23, at 345-47 (discussing this agreement which was entered
into in order to advance Canada's and United States' shared interests in security and
development in Arctic region).
266. See Rothwell, supra note 23, at 346 (citing Arctic Cooperation Agreement,
Clause 4, which ensured that legal positions taken by both United States and Canada
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is the Arctic Council, which convened for the first time in 1998,
but with no real delegated power, the Council's role remains yet
to be determined.2 6 7 At the moment, the Council operates on a
minimal budget and only low-level officials of its eight Member
States attend meetings, hinting that thus far States are not devot-
ing significant resources to the Council.2 6 8
3. Ratification of UNCLOS
With 149 signatories,269 UNCLOS is one of the most widely
adhered-to conventions in the world. 270 The signatories include
all of the permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council ex-
cept the United States.2 7' As a non-signatory to UNCLOS, the
United States cannot participate in the work of the Commission,
putting at risk thousands of square kilometers of resource-rich
U.S. continental shelf.272 As a result, the United States' non-sig-
natory status can effectively prevent it from protecting its other
oceans interests.2 73
would not be affected by this Agreement); see also Franklyn Griffiths, Breaking the Ice on
Canada-U.S. Arctic Co-operation, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 22, 2006 (describing how 1988 Arc-
tic Cooperation Agreement between Canada and United States did not prejudice terri-
torial claims by either State in any subsequent court dispute).
267. See Johnston, supra note 46, at 154. For more information on the Arctic
Council, see http://www.arctic-council.org/ (providing information about Member
States, secretariat, and other information officially provided by Arctic Council).
268. See Johnston, supra note 46, at 154. For more information on the Arctic
Council, see http://www.arctic-council.org/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) (providing in-
formation about purpose of Arctic Council, goals sought to be achieved, and other
information about Arctic Council and its operations).
269. See Chronological list of ratification of UNCLOS, available at http://www.un.
org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronologicallists-of ratifications.htm#The%United%
NationsConvention%on%the%Law%ofthe%Sea (noting all current UNCLOS signa-
tories); see also Lieutenant Colonel Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft
Over the High Seas in the Global War on Terror, 59 AIR FORCE L. Rv. 73, 92 (2007) (detail-
ing signatory status of UNCLOS).
270. See Moore, supra note 125, at 2-24 (arguing that United States stands virtually
alone in not being signatory to UNCLOS); see also Williams, supra note 269, at 92 (de-
tailing that of all major maritime States, United States is only non-signatory to UN-
CLOS).
271. See Antrim, supra note 221, at 15 (noting this novel position of United States
as non-signatory); see also Williams, supra note 269, at 92 (detailing that of all major
maritime States, United States is single non-signatory to UNCLOS).
272. See Golovko, supra note 38 (describing Russian claim under review by Com-
mission as covering amount of oil roughly numbering five billion tons); see also Sallot,
supra note 38, at 1 (highlighting fact that there is significant amount of sediment on
seabed as indicator that there is gas and oil underneath seabed).
273. See Moore supra note 125, at 16-17 (testifying that if United States ratified
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Although it is not a signatory State to UNCLOS,2 7 4 the
United States was the leading participant in its shaping. 275
When UNCLOS was formally adopted in 1982,276 however, a pro-
vision regulating the exploitation of mineral resources in the
deep seabed led to the Reagan Administration's decision not to
ratify the agreement, 277 even though that Administration ac-
cepted other provisions in UNCLOS as a codification of existing
customary international law. 278 After U.S. State Department rep-
resentatives consulted with a representative group of countries
operating under U.N. auspices, they found common ground re-
garding the governance of deep seabed mining and, in 1994,
completed a successful negotiation that led all major industrial
States to ratify UNCLOS. 2 7 9
UNCLOS, for example, it would be able to see election of U.S. nationals to Interna-
tional Tribunals for UNCLOS ("Tribunal")); see also Antrim, supra note 221, at 15 (ar-
guing that operating outside of UNCLOS provisions will put United States in inferior
bargaining position in its current and future conflicts with UNCLOS signatories).
274. See Antrim, supra note 221, at 15 (arguing for United States' ratification UN-
CLOS, Antrim notes novel position of United States as non-signatory); see also Williams,
supra note 269, at 92 (detailing that of all major maritime States, United States is only
non-signatory to UNCLOS).
275. See Moore, supra note 125, at 6-7 (describing United States as principle propo-
nent of UNCLOS); see also Antrim, supra note 221, at 5 (discussing early lobbying efforts
of United States that gave shape to deep seabed mining regime of UNCLOS).
276. See David E. Pitt, U.S. Seeks to "Fix" Mining Provisions of Sea Treaty, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1993 (describing that when UNCLOS was opened for signature in 1982,
United States made decision not to sign due to contentions regarding deep seabed
mining regime); see also Antrim, supra note 221, at 6 (detailing U.S. reasons for not
ratifying UNCLOS along with other States in 1982).
277. See Antrim, supra note 221, at 6 (describing Reagan Administration's conten-
tion that deep seabed mining regime of UNCLOS economically favored developing
States and was, as such, inapposite to U.S. interests); see also The Law of the Sea Treaty and
Reauthorization of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
On Oceanography, Gulf of Mexico, and the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Seabed Mining, 103rd
Cong. 37 (1994) (Statement of Ambassador David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Oceans) (explaining U.S. rationales for not ratifying UNCLOS as rooted in
treaty language regarding deep seabed mining regime).
278. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 880 (describing that while United States
did not sign UNCLOS, United States viewed it as codification of customary interna-
tional maritime law); see also Antrim, supra note 221, at 6 (asserting that while United
States was not successful in challenging deep seabed mining regime, it was pleased with
international stability, otherwise, that UNCLOS ratification provided).
279. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 905-07 (detailing compromises struck be-
tween major industrial and developing States); see also Pitt, supra note 276 (examining
Clinton Administration's attempts to "renegotiate" sections of UNCLOS that had been
disputed by Reagan's Administration).
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After this agreement was reached,28 ° the Administration of
President William J. Clinton announced that the United States
would sign it and sent UNCLOS to the U.S. Senate for advice
and consent.2 81 A group of Senators, however, formerly led by
retired five-term Senator Jesse Helms and now led by Senator
James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma, have managed to repeatedly
block U.S. ratification of the UNCLOS, 28 2 claiming that it will
impinge on U.S. sovereignty. 283 This deadlock persists in spite of
the support of the American Petroleum Institute 28 4 and the cur-
rent Administration of President George W. Bush 285 in favor of
UNCLOS ratification.
III. ARCTIC APPEASEMENT THROUGH
UNCLOS RATIFICATION
The Arctic melt is causing a rapid reduction in the ice levels
that have covered the Arctic Oceans for centuries. 286 This melt
280. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 905-07 (detailing compromises struck be-
tween major industrial and developing States); see also Letter of Submittal from the
State Department to the President, Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting [UNCLOS] and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part
XI [the deep seabed mining provision] of the [UNCLOS] Doc. No. 103-39 of Oct. 7,
1994 (explaining to U.S. Senate that compromises reached are responsive to problems
cited by Reagan Administration).
281. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 905 (describing details of Clinton Adminis-
tration's announcement); see also Pitt, supra note 276 (providing political context of
Clinton Administration's desire for United States to ratify UNCLOS).
282. See Krauss et al., supra note 5 (detailing Republican Senators' hostility to UN-
CLOS); see also Cornelia Dean, Bush Forms Panel to Coordinate Ocean Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2004, at A13 (explaining that Senate opposition is sole impediment to UN-
CLOS ratification); Editorial Desk, Rescuing the Law of the Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004
(characterizing position currently taken by U.S. Senate as xenophobic).
283. See Krauss et al., supra note 5 (describing Republican opposition rooted in
fears that it stands in opposition to U.S. sovereignty. But see Moore, supra note 125, at
10-11 (detailing long history of United States in shaping of UNCLOS provisions and
virtual unanimous support it enjoys across whole of U.S. military due to shared belief in
centrality of UNCLOS to U.S. interests).
284. See Moore, supra note 125, at 2-3, n. 5 (citing letter from President of Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute to Chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of Oct.
1, 1996, in support of UNCLOS); see also Krauss et al., supra note 5 (describing Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute as proponent of UNCLOS).
285. See Dean, supra note 284 (describing Administration's of George W. Bush sup-
port of UNCLOS); see also Krauss et al., supra note 5 (detailing Bush Administration's
characterization of UNCLOS ratification as urgent need).
286. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text (discussing scientific conditions
and environmental factors that are causing global warming and, in particular, melting
of Arctic ice caps).
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will open both extremely valuable shipping routes and previ-
ously untapped natural resources.287 These changing conditions
heighten the need to address the existing disputes among sover-
eign States, which have previously been left unresolved due to
the region's inaccessibility, and come to satisfactory resolutions
for all parties involved.28 8
A. Submission to the ICJ is Unlikely
1. The Northwest Passage in Front of the ICJ
To perfect its title to the Northwest Passage through the ICJ,
Canada would submit to, and ultimately convince, the ICJ that
the Northwest Passage is outside the scope of the UNCLOS defi-
nition of international strait and is determined to be internal
waters enclosed by legal straight baselines; or if the Passage were
found to be historic waters, assuming the United States and the
international community honored an ICJ decision to such effect,
Canada would finally perfect title to the Northwest Passage.289
In 1985, Canada announced its establishment of straight base-
lines around its arctic archipelago in order to enclose the waters
surrounding the islands as internal waters, and enable it to exert
control over a critical part of the Northwest Passage. 290 The as-
sertion of straight baselines could determine the status of the
Northwest Passage. If confronted with the legitimacy of such ac-
tion, the ICJ will likely base its decision on the Fisheries Case.29 1
287. See supra notes 5-7, 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing potential for
new, valuable shipping routes from Europe to Asia, as well as possibility that precious
natural resources such as oil deposits could exist below sea floors that lie beneath ice of
Northwest Passage).
288. See supra notes 5, 20-33 and accompanying text (detailing potential conflicts
over sovereignty in region, in particular current and future disputes over sovereignty
and innocent travel of Northwest Passage).
289. See supra notes 45-185 and accompanying text (discussing existing interna-
tional law dealing with international strait and analyzing whether Northwest Passage
would fit that definition).
290. See supra notes 46-77 and accompanying text (discussing Canada's establish-
ment of straight baselines in 1985 as attempt to enclose Arctic waters north of Canada,
thereby making them internal waters of Canada).
291. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (discussing Fisheries Case and,
particularly, requirements necessary to establish legal straight baselines around coastal
regions, namely: (1) baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from general
direction of coastline; (2) waters lying within baselines must be closely linked to coastal
State's domain as to be considered internal waters; and (3) that waters represent eco-
nomic interests which are particular to region and which have an importance evi-
denced by long history of use).
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An evaluation of the ICJ's test for establishing baselines sug-
gests that the ICJ would most likely find that the baselines signifi-
cantly depart from the Canadian coastline when viewed as a
whole. Irrespectively, because the Canadian coastline is varied
with peninsulas and indentations, coupled with the argument
that outer coasts of the archipelagic islands together make up
the northern Canadian coastline, the ICJ would most likely find
that the first requirement of the Fisheries Case is satisfied with re-
gard to the Canadian baselines.292 When analyzing the second
factor of the test, the ICJ would most likely determine that the
waters lying within the baselines are sufficiently closely linked to
Canada's domain as to be considered internal waters due to the
fact that Canada's Arctic Archipelago has a higher ratio of land
to sea than that of the Norwegian skjaergaard in the Fisheries Case,
a test that some experts have advocated.293 The ICJ would then
determine that Canada has sufficient economic interests, evi-
denced by a long history of use, meeting the third requirement
of the test. The Court would also find that the history of Cana-
dian exploration and trade, along with the economic harm de-
rived from any potential environmental damage due to unregu-
lated foreign travel, would give Canada a sufficient economic in-
terest. The Court could determine that the habitation of the
region by the Inuit would be sufficient to satisfy the third re-
quirement.294 If the questions of the legality of the Canadian
straight baselines came before the ICJ, the Court would likely
uphold their legitimacy, essentially freezing the analysis of
whether the Northwest Passage was an international strait to only
the activity in the region up until 1985.295
If the Court found the Northwest Passage to be an interna-
tional strait before 1985, foreign vessels could have the right of
292. See supra notes 57, 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing first prong of test
for baselines set forth in Fisheries Case, and potential problems that Canada might have
in trying to persuade court that this prong is satisfied with respect to baselines drawn
around Canadian coastline).
293. See supra notes 57-80 and accompanying text (discussing second prong of test
set forth in Fisheries Case and comparing it to baselines drawn around Norwegian skjaer-
gaard in Fisheries Case).
294. See supra notes 49-80 and accompanying text (discussing third prong of test
set forth in Fisheries Case and how certain factors specific to Canadian Arctic could lead
ICJ to find that prong was satisfied).
295. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text (describing development of ex-
isting international law with regard to establishment of straight baselines around coasts
and analyzing Canada's establishment of straight baselines in 1985).
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innocent passage through the Arctic waters despite the establish-
ment of straight baselines.296 Additionally, if the Court declined
to uphold the establishment of the straight baselines, innocent
passage would still exist if the Court found the Northwest Pas-
sage to be an international strait, before or after 1985.297 Be-
cause UNCLOS failed to define the term "international strait,"
the ICJ would likely rely on its Corfu Channel Case, which remains
the basis of customary international law governing the existence
of an international strait. That case established two require-
ments for recognition of an international strait-a geographic
element and a functionality element. The ICJ would likely find
the geographic element to be met due to the Northwest Passage
connecting two high seas, the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans
and also connecting EEZs. 298
While a subsidiary inquiry, the second element of function-
ality is far more ambiguous, with questions looming as to
whether it is actual use or potential use that matters. 299 The ICJ
clearly stated that it is actual use that matters, making the poten-
tial Arctic melt and its impact in opening up shipping routes in
the Northwest Passage irrelevant to determining whether or not
the passage is an international strait.""° More telling is whether
the frequency of transits through the Northwest Passage are suf-
ficient to establish use of that area. Although less than fifty com-
pleted transits of the Northwest Passage have been made since
1903-far less than the number of transits through the Corfu
Channel-it is possible that the Arctic conditions that make
passages more difficult may lower the ICJ's standards to deter-
296. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
whether Northwest Passage is an international strait or whether critical parts of this
Passage are internal waters of Canada, subject to their control and sovereignty).
297. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that even
if establishment of baselines is found to be legal, there still might be pre-existing right
of innocent passage for foreign vessels).
298. See supra notes 88-129 and accompanying text (discussing geographic element
that was established in Corfu Channel Case and must be met to designate straits as inter-
national straits and also discussing potential analysis of whether this requirement is met
with respect to Northwest Passage).
299. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (describing second prong, func-
tionality prong, of test established in Corfu Channel Case and differing opinions of what
level of traffic is necessary to satisfy this prong, as well as whether this prong would be
met with respect to Northwest Passage).
300. See supra notes 91-128 and accompanying text (discussing number of transits
so far of Northwest Passage and also conditions that exist in region and difficulty of
making transits under such conditions).
2007] 1645
1646 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1587
mine a sufficient level of functionality.3 °'
The Court would likely find the Northwest Passage to be an
international strait due to meeting the geographic element and
would allow the small number of transits to meet the functional-
ity element. 3 2 From an equitable standpoint, it is likely that the
functional element would be met and the ICJ would categorize
the Northwest Passage as an international strait due to the diffi-
cult temperate conditions, the existence of actual historical tran-
sits, and the inequitable consequences of not allowing the inter-
national community to shave off thousands of miles and fuel
necessary to traverse the alternative South American route. The
equitable argument would grant safe passage to the interna-
tional community, while UNCLOS would still allow Canada to
control its waters under Article 234.303
Although the ICJ could base its decision on the interna-
tional law governing international straits and straight baselines,
it might instead base any decision it rendered upon the interna-
tional law of historic waters or historic consolidation of title.30 4
The ICJ defined the legal theory of historic waters in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case as waters that are treated as internal wa-
ters due to the existence of historic title.30 5 The ICJ would also
likely look to the U.S. Supreme Court decision, U.S. v. Alaska,
where the Court established three requirements for a claim of
historical internal waters: (1) the State exercised authority over
the area, (2) the authority was continuous, and (3) there was
acquiescence by foreign States.30 6 When analyzing these require-
ments, the ICJ would likely find that Canada has not exercised
sufficient control over the waters of the Northwest Passage to
301. See supra notes 113-126 and accompanying text (discussing functionality
prong of this test established in Corfu Channel Case and also analyzing whether environ-
mental factors present in Northwest Passage would change analysis of this prong with
respect to this route).
302. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text (discussing functionality re-
quirement and number of actual transits of Northwest Passage and predicting whether
this level of traffic would be sufficient to satisfy functionality requirement for Passage).
303. See supra notes 231-237 and accompanying text (discussing principles of eq-
uity that ICJ might use and how they might use these principles in resolving question of
whether Northwest Passage is international strait).
304. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text (discussing these two theories
and elements necessary to support such claims).
305. See supra notes 139-168 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing An-
glo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and, in particular, definition of theory of historic waters).
306. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing Alaska).
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meet the first requirement, due in large part to the fact that the
Canadian government, in 1985, publicly admitted that no Cana-
dian government had ever even defined the boundaries of its
internal waters or territorial sea.3 ° 7 The ICJ would also likely
conclude that any authority that Canada exercised over the wa-
ters was not continuous, because the travels of the early British
and French explorers were simple expeditions and once again,
Canada did not even define its waters, concluding that it could
not assert any control over territory it did not recognize as its
own. 308 Moreover, there has hardly been acquiescence by for-
eign States, in particular the United States, to Canadian control,
extinguishing Canadian claims under the third prong:3° 9 It fol-
lows, therefore, that the ICJ would not find that Canada has sov-
ereignty over the Passage based on the theory of historic internal
waters, 0
Similar to the theory of historic waters, it would be unlikely
that the ICJ would find for Canadian sovereignty based on his-
toric consolidation of title, despite the fact that Canada may
have acquired title from discovery by English explorers, because
of the questionable claims of control over the waters of the
Northwest Passage.3 1
The Canadian claims would similarly be weak under the
doctrine of uti possidetis, due to the fact that the ICJ has tradition-
ally used this theory where there is a disputed border between
two countries, not where a State attempts to claim waters as in-
ternal. Although Canada may claim that the transfer of its terri-
tory from Great Britain and its many assertions of control over
the waters of the Northwest Passage establish a valid claim under
the theories of historic claims of ownership, the lack of acquies-
cence by the United States and the lack of defined territory over
which its control has historically been exerted is fatal to its
307. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing Canadian Secretary
of State declaring Canadian sovereignty over Arctic Archipelago and Northwest Pas-
sage).
308. See supra notes 133-135, 145-147 and accompanying text (discussing early ex-
ploration of Arctic region).
309. See supra notes 151-168 and accompanying text (discussing third prong of the-
ory of historic waters and analyzing this prong with respect to Northwest Passage).
310. See supra notes 136-168 and accompanying text (analyzing theory of historic
internal waters with respect to Northwest Passage).
311. See supra notes 169-176 and accompanying text (analyzing theory of historic
consolidation of title with respect to Northwest Passage).
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claims under the three historic theories previously addressed.
31 2
2. Hans Island in Front of the ICJ
Before the dispute over the Northwest Passage comes before
the ICJ, Canada would most likely prefer to submit a claim to the
ICJ for a resolution of the dispute over Hans Island. The ICJ
would have to examine similar issues and arguments in the latter
dispute, and so it would be an important test case for the more
important dispute over the Northwest Passage. 3  Canada would
likely make a claim of sovereignty over Hans Island based on
historic consolidation of title. 14 While any argument based on
this theory is hampered by the fact that there are no inhabitants
that have or do peacefully possess the island, the ICJ should
overlook this factor and focus on the requirements of adminis-
trative control and discovery. Despite the actions that both Den-
mark and Canada have taken in recent years to assert control
over the island, the ICJ would likely find that there has not been
sufficient control by either State, as the existence of plaques and
flags are probably not enough to qualify as control.31 5 Both
States have similar claims to discovery: although British explor-
ers may have noticed or landed on the island since the 1840s,
the island was named after a Greenlander, traveling with a U.S.
explorer, in 1871. To distinguish one State's claim from the
other under this theory, the ICJ might look to the use of the
surrounding waters by the Inughuit of Greenland, who could be
considered to have control or even be peaceful possessors since
the fourteenth century." 6 Given this last piece of information,
the ICJ would likely find that this was sufficient to grant sover-
eignty to Denmark in the dispute, if it based its decision on his-
toric consolidation of title.31v
312. See supra notes 130-185 and accompanying text (analyzing specific case of
Northwest Passage with respect to theories of historic ownership).
313. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (discussing dispute over Hans
Island and reasons that Canada and Denmark would submit this dispute to ICJ for reso-
lution).
314. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text (discussing early exploration
of Hans Island).
315. See supra notes 186-187, 199-201 and accompanying text (describing recent
activity involving Hans Island and also arguing that dependence on plaques does not
make strong case for sovereignty).
316. See supra note 186-203 and accompanying text (discussing history and discov-
ery of Hans Island and how this might impact dispute over it).
317. See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text (discussing historical use of
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The ICJ might decide that the theory of historic consolida-
tion of title was an inadequate means to make a decision over
the small rock's nationality. The Court might then utilize either
factors of geography, as it did in the dispute over the rock of
Gibraltar, or even the more innovative idea that it could deter-
mine the sovereignty over Hans Island based on its inclusion in
either State's EEZ.3 "8 Based on history and previous dispute res-
olutions, it is difficult to predict the outcomes under both of
these theories. Therefore, the only theory which would result in
a clear outcome would be that for Denmark under historic con-
solidation of title.319
B. Entering into a Treaty like the Antarctic Treaty
While the resolution of either the dispute over the North-
west Passage or Hans Island in front of the ICJ would produce an
all-or-nothing result, an alternative solution both disputes, as
well as the other disputes and considerations in the Arctic re-
gion, is to form a treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty in the
Arctic region. Following from the success of the Antarctic Treaty
in postponing territorial disputes in Antarctic so that compro-
mise could be reached on more pressing and important environ-
mental issues, there have been a few agreements between Arctic
States that have attempted to put off territorial claims in the
same manner to focus on more pressing issues.320 Unfortu-
nately, the Arctic Council and the Arctic Cooperation Agree-
ment have not been as successful as the Antarctic Treaty. One
solution to this problem would be to devote more effort and re-
sources to ensure the success of either. Although each of these
attempts, along with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,
were based on the best intentions, none has had the desired ef-
Hans Island and its surrounding areas and how this might impact claims of sovereignty
based on historic consolidation of title).
318. See supra notes 204-211 and accompanying text (discussing EEZ's and how
they are defined, as well as their potential effect on this dispute over Hans Island).
319. See supra notes 26-32, 186-215 and accompanying text (discussing dispute over
Hans Island, especially history of rock and how this would affect claim of historic con-
solidation of title).
320. See supra notes 253-268 and accompanying text (discussing Antarctic Treaty
and how similar treaties could act to solve many Arctic problems and disputes, such as
dispute over Hans Island and claims of sovereignty over waters of Northwest Passage).
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fect, and therefore, starting over might be the best decision. 1
The Arctic States should join together in forming an Arctic
Treaty, perhaps with identical language to that of the Antarctic
Treaty. While such a treaty would solve many of the environ-
mental issues in the region, it might not have a strong enough
effect on the territorial disputes, and so it might not satisfy all
States, some of whom are more concerned with their sovereignty
claims than environmental issues. 2 2
C. Ratification of UNCLOS
As evidenced by the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement
between the United States and Canada, 32 3 both countries ac-
knowledge the need to collaborate in the navigation of the
Northwest Passage and are sensitive to the unique maritime envi-
ronment. As both a signatory to UNCLOS and a coastal State, it
can implement the provisions of Article 42 into its laws and regu-
lations concerning the conduct of vessels in transit passage
through the Northwest Passage.3 24  Due to Canada's long-ex-
pressed concern with the protection of its Arctic marine environ-
ment,325 and because of scientific projections regarding the dan-
ger that the Arctic melt may be causing, 326 Canada has a strong
argument that the provisions of Article 234 of UNCLOS should
apply to the Northwest Passage. 27
In order for vessels to pass safely through the Northwest Pas-
sage, the United States should acknowledge Canada's superior
position in the management of the Northwest Passage under
321. See supra notes 253-268 and accompanying text (discussing measures at-
tempted in Arctic to settle various disputes in this region).
322. See supra notes 253-268 and accompanying text (discussing potential for Arc-
tic treaties that would settle all disputes and discussing how such possibilities might not
be probable given differences between situations in Antarctic and situations in Arctic).
323. See supra notes 253-268 and -accompanying text (describing Arctic Coopera-
tion Agreement and its formation).
324. See supra notes 62-64, 84-85, 108-112 (discussing codification, by UNCLOS, of
existing international law with regards to establishment of straight baselines and also
innocent passage through international straits).
325. See supra notes 151-157 and accompanying text (discussing attempts by Ca-
nada to control its Arctic waters, including its enactment of AWPPA).
326. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (discussing scientific research
suggesting that Arctic may undergo rapid climate change within next century).
327. See supra note 62-129 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood that
Northwest Passage would be found to be legally enclosed by Canada's straight baselines
and whether there would be right of innocent passage due to Northwest Passage being
deemed international strait).
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UNCLOS, not only due to Canada's geographic proximity and
experience with navigating the Northwest Passage, but also be-
cause of the decreased ability of the United States to operate in
the Arctic Ocean.3 28 The UNCLOS transit passage regime, in
conjunction with Article 234 provides Canada ample jurisdiction
to enforce stringent environmental standards commensurate
with the risks that exist in Arctic waters. 29 Indeed, becoming a
signatory to UNCLOS would actually provide the United States
guaranteed freedom of navigation through the Northwest Pas-
sage.33' Finally, commercial shipping of the Northwest Passage
can consequently be developed without the fear that every
transit would be considered a threat to Canadian national secur-
ity and sovereignty.
As is the case with any determination of the Hans Island
issue, the Russian claim will be resolved by a factual finding
under UNCLOS committees.33" ' States that have not signed UN-
CLOS are barred from making appointments to these commit-
tees, thereby leaving significant matters of national interest in
the hands of other States. 32 As such, it would behoove any non-
signatory State with interests in the Arctic region, such as the
United States, to ratify UNCLOS, as not doing so will leave these
interests in the cold.
CONCLUSION
The scientific evidence makes it clear that the Arctic Circle
is warming rapidly, leading to ice-free summers in the Arctic
Ocean in the near future-a state that will persist for centuries.
This warming is projected to make vast quantities of natural re-
sources available for exploitation, and create access to an incred-
328. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (detailing possibility that transits of
Northwest Passage may become more difficult in short term).
329. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (listing fights and obligations
that were codified by UNCLOS for State's internal waters and discussing rights that
Canada would have if Northwest Passage were found to be legally enclosed by its
straight baseline system, no matter if there was right of innocent passage).
330. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing effects of United States
becoming signatory to UNCLOS).
331. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing how some disputes might
be settled under authority of UNCLOS and its systems).
332. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing how some disputes be-
tween States could be resolved through system established under UNCLOS rather than
ICJ or other method).
20071 1651
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
ibly valuable shipping lane between the Atlantic to the Pacific
Oceans. Despite these clear economic benefits, or because of
them, there are disputes in the region that could impede its use.
There are three possibilities for resolution, which have varying
advantages and disadvantages. The most desirable resolution
would come from universal adoption of UNCLOS. Universal
adoption would benefit all States, because currently any non-sig-
natory Arctic State, such as the United States, cannot take full
advantage of the potential benefits in the region without ratifica-
tion of UNCLOS. While a resolution before the ICJ offers a far
more permanent resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic,
the zero sum game of such a resolution makes it unlikely that
Canada and the other States involved would submit to the
Court's jurisdiction. An Antarctic-like treaty, or a strengthened
and properly charged Arctic Council, could be a useful mecha-
nism to postpone territorial disputes and foster temporary coop-
eration amongst signatories. Yet, potential uncertainties stem-
ming from any Arctic treaties make this option potentially unde-
sirable.
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that universal adher-
ence to UNCLOS is the most efficient mechanism through
which to balance the interests of the Arctic States. Denmark and
Canada, having both ratified UNCLOS, could potentially resolve
their dispute over Hans Island by controlling the water sur-
rounding Hans Island under the EEZ. Similarly, Canada, the
United States, and other Arctic States could use UNCLOS to re-
solve the disputed issues surrounding the Northwest Passage. In
order to protect interests in the Arctic region, non-signatory
countries must join the rest of the international community in
ratifying UNCLOS.
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